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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to evince the importance to track corporate reputation and its impact in 
a context of globalisation, important information flows and high competitiveness. To do 
so, this study is focused on Corporate Reputation in Spain which in this case will be 
examined in two different ways, by analysing MERCO ranking, considered one 
consolidated reference and objective measurement tool for large companies operating in 
Spain; and then through a case study based on El Corte Inglés.  
Overall, from MERCO ranking analysis we find that Corporate Reputation is a powerful 
strategic asset linked to successful performance and management. However, we also 
find that it is difficult to build and sustain such that it takes great effort to generate 
confidence and positive perceptions across key firm’s constituents, regardless they are 
from inside or outside the company, in order to both keep a stability and maximize 
resources of competitive advantage against competitors in a constantly changing and 
competitive environment. 
Furthermore, from the case study displayed dealing with concepts of reputation 
management and measurement, it highlights the importance of recognizing and adapting 
company’s business model and overcome new market needs. Moreover, it also points 
out the strategic value of decisions taken in the long run such as growth financing 
through D/E ratio, and the allocation of company’s resources in profit generation 
through ROE and ROA, not only in monetary terms but also in efficiency of company’s 
assets.  
 
Keywords: Corporate reputation, MERCO, El Corte Inglés, performance, strategic 
assets, competitive advantage. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is usual to make assessments based on quantitative, material and substantial facts that 
can be measured, for instance companies use turnover, Return on Equity and other 
ratios.  
However, there are many other aspects to keep in mind when trying to determine the 
assessment of a company. This is the case of intangible traits such as corporate 
reputation as well as confidence or satisfaction.   
Actually, these intangible aspects have relevant impact on performance, 
competitiveness and perceptions held, not only by internal constituents as directors or 
employees, but also by external ones such as clients or competitors.  
Recently, Corporate Reputation was grown relevance being in the spotlight due to its 
strategic nature driving significant competitive advantage for those companies with the 
ability to manage it appropriately and competitively.  
Nevertheless, it requires great attention and effort to build, maximize and sustain it. 
Hence, it is relevant to focus on Corporate Reputation management in order to make 
adequate assessment of it and identify possible drawbacks.  
There is a variety of measurement tools based on different dimensions. Among all these 
tools, MERCO Ranking assesses corporate reputation based on different groups of 
interest, also known as constituents, and it includes most well assessed companies 
operating in Spain on annual basis. The evolution of companies included in the ranking 
shows company’s ability to manage its corporate reputation as well as the generation of 
perceptions and expectations on its key constituents which contributes to build and 
maintain corporate reputation.  
From one special case in the ranking, El Corte Inglés, it is displayed a case study, 
analysing different components of the company in order to uncover possible reasons 
behind company’s path followed over the years in the ranking. 
Overall, some conclusions regarding Corporate Reputation management for the specific 
case of El Corte Inglés, as well as for the MERCO ranking are drawn at the end in this 
thesis.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. The Concept: The Rising of Corporate Reputation 
Corporate reputation must be highlighted as an intangible capable of driving the 
company to excellence and competitive position (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
Actually, Fombrun (1996) referred to the significance of reputation’s value stating that 
‘Reputation builds strategic value for a company by granting it a competitive advantage 
that rivals have trouble overcoming. To achieve that advantage, however, a company 
must develop appropriate practices, or character traits, as it were, that rivals find 
difficult to imitate’.  
One important aspect is the position that the company takes regarding the management 
and, therefore, the maximization of the most valuable asset by actively working on it, 
or, in contrast, by allowing a passive generation by outsiders’ perceptions. Indeed, that 
reputation’s building process based on people thoughts requires long periods of time. 
Nevertheless, a good reputation can be damaged very quickly since it is not 
indestructible. It can be destroyed instantaneously due to its high volatility as it 
happened in the case of Enron Corporation Scandal1 (Alsop, 2004). 
As a result, companies must be constantly focused on threats’ identification and defence 
strategies development to overcome possible challenges that may arise from the 
environment in order to avoid painful consequences derived from the failure when 
protecting corporate reputations (Alsop, 2004). 
                                                 
1
 Enron Corporation Scandal is also known as ‘The collapse of a Wall Street Darling’. The corporation 
was named as “America Most Innovative Company” for six consecutive years (1996-2001). 
With the burst of the dot-com bubble, it decided to build high-speed broadband telecom networks that 
despite the project investment of hundreds of millions of dollars, the company realized almost no return 
from it. 
Enron’s claimed immediate profit on its books from recently created assets such as power plants - its 
main activity. Then, when revenues did not reach the projected amount, the company transferred these 
losses applying mark-to-market accounting which measures the value of a security based on its current 
market value rather than on its book value. Thus, these practices were designed to hide losses and make 
the company to appear more profitable than it actually was. In that way, Enron wrote off unprofitable 
activities without damaging its bottom line business. When the recession of 2000, Enron Corporation was 
exposed to the most volatile parts of the market that ended up with a collapse affecting thousands of 
employees and shocking Wall Street (NYSE). This shows a classical example of lack of transparency and 
financial manipulation (Alsop, 2004; Investopedia, 2018). 
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Consequently, the rise of competition together with a mass market of information imply 
a direct impact on the flow of information affecting the process of creation, growth and 
change of corporate reputation in a way such that there is the need to manage it 
appropriately and fight against possible rumours aiming to damage the reputation.  
From the last few years on, the spotlight has been focused on corporate reputation 
(Barnett, Jemier and Lafferty, 2006). Indeed, it turned to be one strategic asset such that 
its importance is remarkable being one of the two most popular indicators worldwide 
for organisations nowadays (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
According to Barnett et al  (2006), ‘during the period of 2001 until 2003, the average 
number of scholarly articles on corporate reputation more than doubled in frequency 
compared with the year 2000. In short, the importance of corporate reputation is 
evident’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Average number of scholarly articles on Corporate Reputation. Author's computations based on Barnett et 
al, 2006. 
Recently, it has been proved that competitive advantage that arises from reputation is 
even more powerful than the traditional approaches that managers have been applying 
based on strategic positioning (Fombrun, 1996). 
Actually, the change in corporate reputation trends driven by recession and last 
economic crisis is translated into the rise of a new economic cycle which is 
characterised by the «economy of intangibles and corporate reputation» (Carreras, 
Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
From a 
journal! 
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Therefore, these fluctuations in economic cycles point out the relevance of achieving 
high levels of confidence and loyalty for organisations whose management of corporate 
reputation must be done properly due to its significance to build up and recover 
confidence. For this reason, behind a good reputation, which has the ability to gain and 
maintain confidence of company’s groups of interest, lies a great tool that managers 
should foster to empower confidence needed (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Furthermore, the internationalization process of many firms plays an important role in 
reputation because, not only internationalised firms, but also local ones, must overcome 
overseas competition of a nearly and progressively more globalised market. So, it is 
fundamental the inherent presence of a source of differentiation within corporate 
reputation that sustains company’s competitive advantage (Carreras, Alloza and 
Carreras, 2013). 
In that sense, there is a mutual link between the global view of a company and the 
country of origin, since it takes place a bidirectional exchange of attributes that defines 
both sides. For instance, according to the BAV (Brand Asset Valuator) study on the 
airline sector performed by Y&R agency, in accordance with the opinions of Spanish 
consumers, IBERIA is identified by 44% with the values Spain as well as Lufthansa by 
89% with the ones from Germany. Therefore, in companies DNA can be distinguished 
their countries of origin and vice versa (ReasonWhy, 2016). 
 
 
  
10 
 
2.2. Corporate Identity, Corporate Image and Corporate Reputation 
The concept of «corporate reputation» has been defined from distinct approaches which 
made evident the need to create a framework making possible to encompass those 
approaches towards a common demarcation and interpretation of it (Barnett et al, 2006). 
Therefore, before reaching a concrete definition of corporate reputation, it is important 
to distinguish, according to Walker (2010), between the three terms ‘corporate identity, 
corporate image and corporate reputation’ and the relationship among them. Indeed, 
these concepts are related to successful organisation performance (Roberts and 
Dowling, 2002). 
However, before presenting the different terms, it is interesting to consider the key 
organisational viewpoints and the relationship between them (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, and 
Whetten, 2006). 
The four dimensions are presented through key questions.  
1. Who are we as an organisation: it refers to the internal stakeholders and, certainly, it 
is associated to the identity. In this case, Brown et al (2006) propose a distinction 
between organisational identity and perceived organisational identity. 
Organisational identity alludes to the organisational level of the company whereas 
Perceived organisational identity concerns the way individuals taking part on the 
organisation perceive this identity. 
2. What does the organisation want others to think about the organisation: it refers to 
the position the organisation occupies in key stakeholders minds. In other words, 
which desired attributes are the ones associated to the organisation by its 
constituents.  In this case, Brown et al (2006) approach to it as ‘the intended image 
of the organisation for a stakeholder group’. This intended image despite being 
spread across stakeholders will differ sometimes across individuals on the company. 
3. What does the organisation believe others think of the organisation: it corresponds 
to the mental associations that internal stakeholders believe that outsiders ones hold 
concerning the company. In this case, Brown et al (2006) refer to it as ‘construed 
image’. 
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4. What do stakeholders actually think of the organisation: it makes reference to 
reputation held by external stakeholders, so the actual perception held by 
stakeholders outside the organisation (Brown et al, 2006). 
2.2.1. Corporate identity 
Identity was often considered to be a key basic element of the company for its 
workforce (Barnett et al., 2006; Walker, 2010). 
Afterwards, organizational identity distinguishes among desired identity which refers 
to the knowledge and thoughts of internal stakeholders according to the organisation, 
and, the other one based on actual identity referring in this case to the actual 
knowledge and thoughts the internal stakeholders have about the firm (Walker, 2010). 
Concretely, corporate identity is composed by corporate culture and philosophy 
established in the long-run by internal stakeholders within the organisation in a 
unidimensional way. Therefore, it has the ability to provide an overview on values and 
principles that describe internal constituents, employees and managers, from the 
company (Fombrun, 1996).  
Fombrun (1996) emphasizes the importance inherent in the name of the company 
stating that ‘names matter because they convey information to people inside and outside 
the organisation’. Indeed, the company name represents the essence, the main core 
attributes of the company. As a result, any change on the company name is of complex 
nature since it does not only affect the image projected by the company but also those 
attributes and traits that identifies the company as well. 
Actually, identity acts as a constraint in decision making, in long run actions and in the 
performance of the company since every decision taken must be consistent with the 
company’s identity. Therefore, identity is considered to be a backbone of reputation. It 
shows the nature of company’s relationships with four key constituents including 
employees, consumers, investors and communities they collaborate with.  
  
12 
 
2.2.2. Corporate image 
Organizational image is considered to be formed by the internal projection of the 
company to the external agents (Walker, 2010).  
Indeed, corporate image is composed by external stakeholders established in the short-
run, but it is not static, so, it can also change in the short-run as well. It is set on 
corporate identity from outside the organisation and it is based on the communication of 
the organisation (Carrió, 2013).  
Most managers aim to keep sustainable and favourable images among company’s 
constituents by taking care of relationships with customers, investors, analysts and the 
media. However, it is very complex to control corporate image due to information 
asymmetries such as rumours affecting directly company’s reputation and the 
impressions on it. Therefore, to show a well-regarded image, it is necessary to create a 
cognition that is coherent and consistent both internally and externally (Fombrun, 
1996). 
2.2.3. Corporate reputation 
First of all, reputation can be defined as the collection of the opinions about someone or 
something. Therefore, it results into a combination of different points of view of many 
different people (Roper and Fill, 2012). 
After defining the concept of reputation, we move forward towards corporate 
reputation. 
According to Fombrun (1996), reputation is defined as ‘a perceptual representation of a 
company’s past actions and future prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all 
its key constituents when compared to other leading rivals’. Then, the reputation of an 
organisation consists of perceptions from different classes of people. Indeed, as pointed 
by this author, reputation is ‘the overall estimation in which a company is held by its 
constituents, people inside and outside the company’. 
The first two elements presented before –corporate identity and corporate image- are 
key aspects of corporate reputation (Carrió, 2013). 
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Overall, both corporate identity jointly with corporate image are pillars of reputation 
which is set by both internal and external stakeholders in the long-run. Hence, it comes 
from inside and outside the firm and it can be positive or negative (Walker, 2010) 
As Fombrun (1996) stated ‘when a company serves its constituents well, its name 
become a valuable asset’ which is translated into the strategic value of having powerful 
competitive advantage against its rivals. Therefore, it is crucial to preserve that valuable 
asset which can only be achieved through an appropriate building and care of strong 
relationships among different stakeholders since they are considered essential for it. 
Actually, it is important to keep in mind that corporate reputation contributes to 
corporate performance (Rindova, Williamson and Petkova, 2005). 
Moreover, there is a raise of expectations on their constituents, internal and external, 
such as profitability for investors, performance for employees, as well as, product and 
services conditions and quality for customers and involvement with local communities. 
As a result, responsibility emerges derived from the completion of these expectations 
that contribute to reputation (Alsop, 2004; Fombrun, 1996).  
Hence, it can turn to be an attribute of the company that indicates firm’s capability to 
create value and its competitive advantage position, along with the position in agents’ 
mind (Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
Thus, reputation must be consistent defining company’s identity and it must present 
favourable impressions to all constituents on what the company is, which is its activity, 
and what it stands for (Fombrun, 1996). 
In consequence, it is indispensable for companies to work on their reputations over time 
to achieve that advantage by pursuing uniqueness, credibility and consistency 
(Fombrun, 1996). In that way, the company is able to differentiate itself by building 
trust and halo effect and, similarly, preventing uncertainty given in the market (Alsop, 
2004). 
In addition, Rindova et al (2005) stated from an economic perspective that ‘uncertainty 
is a function of the information asymmetries between competing firms and their 
stakeholders’. Therefore, firms’ aim is to reduce market uncertainty by managing 
information asymmetries in order to take decisions on the true firm’s attributes. Thus, it 
is crucial to promote and ensure the exchange of information between all stakeholders 
in the organisational domain to avoid information asymmetries (Rindova et al, 2005).  
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Certainly, Roberts and Dowling (2002) making reference to uncertainty highlighted the 
important role that resides on reputation regarding what they called “the underlying 
quality of a firm’s offerings” and the difficulties, driven by uncertainty, to maintain and 
prove quality levels in a scenario of competition between firms. Then, they concluded ‘a 
good reputation will enhance a firm’s ability to sustain superior financial performance 
over time’.  
 
 
Corporate 
Identity 
Corporate Image Corporate Reputation 
Stakeholders Internal External Internal and external 
Perception Actual Desired Actual 
Origin Inside Inside Inside and outside 
 
Table  1. Summary table. Author's own elaboration based on data from Walker, 2010. 
 
Actually, the relationship that exists between the three concepts presented above 
highlights companies’ awareness regarding the difference between image and reputation 
which is increasing nowadays.  
As a result, companies try to build and foster strong relationships with customers, going 
beyond the traditional management of company’s image. For instance, Harley Davison 
developed what is called Harley Owners Group (HOG) which consists of 200.000 
members worldwide whose consumer loyalty is empowered through a wide variety of 
services. This successful initiative has a direct impact on Harley Davison’s identity 
being placed among the world’s most valuable corporate brands (Fombrun, 1996). 
2.3.  Corporate Reputation Insight  
2.3.1. Corporate reputation attributes  
Regarding corporate reputation attributes, Fombrun (1996) emphasizes three key ones: 
● Reputation is based on perceptions: as stated by Fombrun (1996) ‘Because a 
reputation is not directly under anyone’s control, it is difficult to manipulate’. 
Thus, it cannot be under control of the corporation (Brown et al., 2006). 
15 
 
● It is the aggregate perception of all stakeholders, internal and external ones. In 
other words, it is a collective concept that arises from the overall assessment all 
constituents of the company (Fombrun, 1996).  
Corporate performance is multidimensional; then, reputation is 
multidimensional as well since it is assessed on specific issues (e.g. Profitability, 
Social Responsibility). Thus, reputation assessment varies depending on the 
issue evaluated and on the stakeholder that is evaluating it. For instance, the case 
of Wal-mart with great profitability -affecting investors- but poor working 
conditions - affecting employees (Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever, 1999; Walker, 
2010).  Overall, companies may have multiple reputations depending on the 
stakeholders and the issues analysed, but reputation is the issue specific 
aggregate perception of all stakeholders, thus, there must be only one aggregated 
reputation per issue which is the sum of all identities and images of the interest 
groups on each dimension, such as an aggregate reputation on profitability and 
so on (Walker, 2010; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
● It is comparative in the long run such that companies evaluate their reputation 
making comparisons with past reputation situation or comparing reputations 
across leaders in the industry (Fombrun, 1996; Watrick, 2002). 
Moreover, Walker (2010), as well as Carreras et al (2013), considers also two additional 
attributes: 
● Corporate reputation can be positive or negative due to its comparative nature.  
● It is stable and enduring. It is based on firms past actions and future prospects in 
the long run.  
 
Consequently, corporate reputation according to Walker (2010), and considering the 
attributes presented above,  provides the following definition: ‘A relatively stable, issue 
specific aggregate perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future 
prospects compared against some standard’.  
Overall, reputation is a representation of multiple images of a company and it shows 
company’s ability to deliver valuable results to multiple stakeholders (Roper and Fill, 
2012).  
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Expectations from constituents are summarized in the figure 2. Mainly, the company in 
order to achieve a good reputation must be able to generate trustworthiness for 
employees through empowerment and respect; credibility for investors through 
profitability, stability and growth prospects; reliability for customers through product 
service and customer service; and finally responsibility with the community serving it 
and taking care of the environment (Fombrun, 1996).  
 
2.3.2. Corporate reputation landscape   
As mentioned previously, there is the need to find a common approach towards 
corporate reputation in terms of definition. Therefore, taking into consideration the 
multidisciplinary concept, we can distinguish between different academic approaches 
(Fombrun and Rindova, 1996; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Economic View  
It is considered as the set of traits that signals a company’s likely behaviours. It refers to 
what the company is, what it does, what it represents and its capability to exert 
influence on economic agents (Fombrun, Gardberg and Sever, 1999; Carreras, Alloza 
and Carreras, 2013).  
  
GOOD 
CORPORATE 
REPUTATION 
 Credibility 
 Trustworthiness 
 Responsibility 
 Reliability 
Figure 1. Elements for a good reputation. Source: Author's own elaboration based on data from Fombrun, 1996. 
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External agents such as investors count with less information than managers on the 
financial performance of the company. Thus, corporate reputation aims to generate and 
increase confidence on those external agents. Indeed, reputation generates perceptions 
on the company among all its constituents– employees, customers, investors, 
competitors and general public. Hence, managers’ objective is to do a strategic use of it 
in order to signal company’s attractiveness (Fombrun, 1997).  
Strategic View 
Reputation is a source of differentiation which is difficult to imitate. Hence, this 
intangible asset is crucial due to its potential for value creation, but also because of its 
complex character to be replicated by competitors (Fombrun, 1997; Carreras, Alloza 
and Carreras, 2013; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). 
Therefore, it represents a barrier to rivals and a source of competitive advantage which 
allows the company to create value on a competitive environment where quality is not 
sufficient to be different and where product and services tend to be more homogeneous 
each time. Hence, the truly source of differentiation and sustainable competitive 
advantage comes from company’s name and reputation associated to it (Fombrun, 
Gardberg and Sever, 1999; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Marketing View 
This perspective focuses on brand equity such that positive associations come to client’s 
mind through brand name or logotypes (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Therefore, from marketing perspective Fombrun et al (1999) consider reputation as 
‘perceptual assets with the power to attract loyal customers’. Consequently, marketers’ 
objective is to distinguish and understand customers’ responses regarding purchase and 
consumption attitudes and assess companies on decisions taken about products and 
services (Brown, 2006). 
Organizational view  
Company’s identity and culture shape business practices. It provides a base for internal 
stakeholders – employees and directors – in order to achieve properly strategic 
objectives of the company. Then, it aims to communicate what the company does, how 
it is done, and how it is communicated to its stakeholders (Fombrun, 1997; Fombrun, 
Gardberg and Sever, 1999; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
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Sociological View 
Reputation is seen as an indicator of social legitimacy for the company. Indeed, 
reputation is built by all its constituents’ contributions. Therefore, as Fombrun (1997) 
pointed out ‘reputations are the aggregate assessments of firms’ performance relative to 
expectations and norms’. As a result, all stakeholders are responsible of the impression 
projected and its social acceptance or rejection (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Accounting View 
Within the accounting perspective, there exists a mismatch between new intangible 
assets arising from perceptions and its incorporation to the accounting plan, in other 
words, earnings reflected in annual statements differ from market valuations of 
companies (Fombrun, 1997). Therefore, Fombrun et al (1999) referred to reputations as 
‘an intangible asset, a form of goodwill whose value fluctuates in the marketplace’.   
Integrative view 
Reputation is defined by the perceptions held by different collectives identity based on 
past performance that influences company’s confidence and reliability levels (Fombrun, 
1997; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
Multistakeholder view 
Companies must both take decisions and set the base of their growth on a long-run 
vision by taking into account each constituent that composes the company and its 
reputation (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
Once and for all, in order to guarantee a good management of this valuable intangible – 
corporate reputation- it is crucial that all intangibles in the company are treated 
rigorously and equally by giving them the same relevance level (Carreras, Alloza and 
Carreras, 2013). 
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2.4.  Measurement of Corporate Reputation 
According to Alsop (2004), reputation can only be well managed by being appropriately 
measured first. Therefore, research procedures must be developed to collect data and 
learn from all different constituents to figure out what drives their reputations. Indeed, it 
refers basically to ‘locate their strengths and weaknesses or image reputation compared 
with chief competitors’. Consequently, companies can develop strategies focused on 
strengthening relationships with their key constituents and, therefore, managing their 
reputation in an effective way (Alsop, 2004).  
2.4.1. Measurement tools 
In order to measure corporate reputation, company’s key constituent groups must be 
identified and there must be a sample of constituents from each group as Fombrun 
(1996) stated ‘The better represented are all of company’s constituents in the 
reputational audit, the more valid is the reputational profile that it generates’. 
This section provides the main measurement methodologies of corporate reputation. 
Firstly, it is important to point out that there are global and rational measurement 
indexes. On one hand, global ones are based on direct rating that evaluates reputation’s 
concept by interest group. They are synthetic and they provide some variability such 
that they are useful when the companies assess all accomplishments and results 
obtained. On the other hand, rational measurement indexes are indirect estimates taking 
into account all the items needed to create corporate reputation. They are able to 
identify weaknesses and strengths of reputation.  
AMAC: Most Admired Companies in America 
The ranking also known as ‘Fortune AMAC’ or ‘Fortune 500’ is the most used tool to 
measure corporate reputation. It presents a representation of the US economy, the 
changes on this economy and the prediction of future trends using data from previous 
annual rankings (Carrió, 2013).   
It was created in 1984 by the Fortune Magazine as a published annual report of the 500 
biggest companies in America that are present in the Stock Market Exchange (Carreras, 
Alloza and Carreras, 2013).   
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The ranking is constructed in accordance to the valuation done by a survey conducted to 
CEOs and financial analysts on different dimensions about the 10 companies with the 
highest revenues in each economic sector of the US. They are asked to rank them with 
respect to eight dimensions that are associated to corporate standing: (1) Management 
quality, (2) Quality of products, (3) Innovation, (4) Long-run invetsments, (5) Financial 
stability and performance, (6) Workplace (7) Social and environmental responsibility, 
and (8) Smart use of corporate resources (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
It depicts how strong and powerful are the US companies. Some companies such as 
Coca-Coca, Wal-mart and more well-known ones are included in the ranking together 
with new emergent ones with the aim to succeed in the place where other did not 
achieve it (Carrió, 2013).    
The dimensions of the ranking lack of empirical base. Similarly, its foundation lays just 
on the perceptions of few groups of stakeholders, not taking into account all the other 
significant constituents that shape corporate reputation (Carrió, 2013).  Moreover, due 
to AMAC’s composition, the global reputation assessment depends more on business 
reputation which is evaluated by six dimensions rather than on social reputation which 
is measured just by three indicators (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).   
Overall, the Fortune AMAC is performed not taking into account the multistakeholder 
approach when referring to reputation (Carrió, 2013).   
WMAC: World’s Most Admired Companies 
The WMAC stands for World’s Most Admired Companies. It was created in 1997 as an 
extension of the AMAC to all globe’s companies by the Fortune magazine (Carrió, 
2013). 
The WMAC consists on the first 1000 US companies including the biggest 500 
previously stated in the AMAC, to which 500 international firms are added belonging to 
55 different industrial sectors and to 33 countries. All of them must share the feature of 
a turnover higher than 10.000 million dollars (Carrió, 2013).  
This tool follows the same methodology as the presented above. In the same way, since 
the WMAC is an extension of the AMAC this method excludes the multistakeholder 
approach when evaluating corporate reputation (Carrió, 2013). 
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CRAVENS REPUTATION INDEX 
Cravens Index was presented in 2013 by Karen Cravens, Elisabeth Oliver and Sridhar 
Ramamoorti. It aims to assess reputation by an independent entity to avoid subjectivity. 
It consists of four stages: (1) Identification of criteria and subcriteria, (2) Definition of 
weighting plan, (3) Auditor’s assessment based on the criteria stablished, and finally, 
(4) Presentation of the aggregated results obtained (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 
2013). 
The criteria is composed by eight components: (1) Quality and value of products and 
services relevant attributes that exert influence on clients loyalty and brand recognition; 
(2) Employees including factors such as training provided or profile of company’s 
workforce; (3) External relations which comprises the quality of the relationships 
established with suppliers, investors and competitors as well as environment and social 
community care; (4) Innovation and value creation where aspects such as new 
products’ introduction or adaptation to clients’ needs is taken into consideration; (5) 
Feasibility and financial stability through the assessment on financial reports; (6) 
Strategy that evaluates risk on decisions taken to assure a good position for the 
company; (7) Culture making reference to ethic practices and ethic codes; and (8) 
Obligations and intangible responsibilities such as commitment with employees, 
communication systems or policies and processes applied (Carreras, Alloza and 
Carreras, 2013).  
Therefore, the overall objective is to determine each component contribution. Thus, the 
index is an aggregated measurement elaborated by independent entities providing a 
trustworthy audit of remarkable components that create the reputation of a company 
(Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
MERCO  
Merco stands for Monitor Empresarial de Reputación Corporativa, in other words, it 
is the Spanish Monitor of Corporate Reputation. It was created in 2001 by Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid with the aim to evaluate corporate reputation of firms operating 
in Spain overcoming measurement weaknesses from other international rankings 
(Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
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It is a reference and objective measurement tool for large companies in the assessment 
and management of corporate reputation since it is the only Spanish monitor that 
evaluates reputation of companies operating in Spain annually.  
It is considered a really significant referent both national and international in the 
business sector by exerting influence not only Spanish territory, but also towards other 
countries such as Argentina, Colombia or Chile.   
From 2011 onwards, Merco expanded its monitors always dedicated to the business 
sector. Apart from Merco Empresas, other annual rankings are created: Merco Líderes, 
valuating business leaders; Merco Marcas Financieras, related to the financial sector; 
Merco Consumo, valuation from consumers point of view; Merco Talento, evaluating 
attractiveness of companies in regard with the employee; and finally, Merco dedicated 
to the valuation of companies with greatest Responsibility and  the best Corporative 
Government.  
Therefore, Merco aims to measure different aspects concerning corporate reputation. It 
combines audits and direct evaluations of groups of interest from expert populations. 
Afterwards, the marks obtained from groups of interest and audits are aggregated and 
computed through a detailed and specific weighting system to get the final Merco value.  
According to Merco’s website, as well as Fernandez and Luna (2007) and Carreras, 
Alloza and Carreras (2013),  the methodology consists on surveys to five types of 
agents:   
● Well-known CEOs to know the opinion on corporate reputation from companies 
operating in Spain regarding six-first-level variables: economic and financial 
results. All companies subject to be evaluated are chosen by them in accordance 
to a general and a sector classification.  
● Evaluation of experts to provide information from different perspectives with 
the ability (1) to analyse and valuate reputational positioning of assessed 
companies, as well as, (2) to exert influence on public opinion.  
● Direct evaluation of merits or Audits, which must be proven, relative to 
corporate reputation of the 100 companies selected from a provisional ranking 
done by qualified technician on analysis and investigation. 
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● Merco Consumo to evaluate corporate reputation of selected firms regarding 
general population by collecting consumers opinions.  
● Merco Talento an independent monitor that assesses the attractiveness of 
different companies as workplaces through employees, undergraduate students, 
former business students and general population as well as human resources 
directors. 
 
  Weights 2016  
 ● GENERAL EVALUATION: Board of directors members 33% DIRECTORS 
EVALUATION 
● Financial analysts 6% 
EXPERTS 
EVALUATION 
● ONG 4% 
● Trade Unions 4% 
● Consumers’ associations 4% 
● Journalists of economic information 6% 
● Business professors 4% 
● Influentials and Social Media Managers 4% 
● MERCO TALENTO: Internal Reputation 10% OTHER 
MONITORS ● MERCO CONSUMO: General Population 10% 
● MERITS EVALUATION: Reputational merits 15% BENCHMARKING 
  
 
 
Figure 2. MERCO methodology. The five evaluations to get a ranking. Source: Author’s own elaboration based on 
data from Merco España 2016. 
 
To sum up, MERCO index aims to depict the most illustrative representation of social 
recognition of a company. As a drawback, this measurement tool grants higher 
relevance to the CEOs vision because they are the ones deciding which companies will 
be evaluated. 
Recently, MERCO has consolidated as a reference tool when measuring corporate 
reputation in organization.  
The Reputation Quotient: RQ   
The Reputation Quotient (RQ) was developed by Fombrun and Server due to the 
fundamental and conceptual weaknesses of corporate reputation measurement 
(Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever, 1999; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
Provisional 
Ranking 
Final Ranking 
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The proposal aims to both measure the reputation from an organisation -according to 
assessment done  by the groups of interest- and set a valid and reliable empirical method 
based on multistakeholder perspective that compose corporate reputations, therefore, 
moving from a concrete group of stakeholders – investors and board of directors - as in 
previous tools presented (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Sever, 1999; Carreras, Alloza and 
Carreras, 2013; Carrió, 2016). 
It is based on the measurement of 20 attributes distributed in the following six 
dimensions: (1) Emotional attractiveness, (2) Goods and services, (3) Vision and 
leadership, (4) Environment workplace, (5) Social responsibility and environment, and 
(6) Financial performance. In these dimensions we can find the attributes summarized in 
the table below (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013; Carrió, 2016).  
 
Dimension Attribute 
1 Emotional attractiveness Positive opinion 
Appreciation and respect  
Trust  
2 Goods and services Care of products and services 
Innovation on products and services 
High quality products and services  
Quality-price relation (value for money) 
3 Vision and leadership Excellent leadership 
Future vision 
Great recognition of markets opportunities 
4 Workplace environment Well-management 
Work-post 
Workers 
5 Social responsibility and 
environment 
Supportive of  good purposes 
Care of environment 
Well-treatment of people 
6 Financial performance Profits 
Low risk investment 
Overcome competition 
Growth perspectives  
 
 
This method is applied in two stages. Firstly, companies that will be evaluated are 
selected through telephone interviews and e-mail surveys where corporate reputation is 
assessed. Afterwards, the selected companies are evaluated from 1 to 7 scale taking into 
consideration the attributes presented above (table 2) through online questionnaire. This 
methodology allows not only getting general perceptions from the public but also the 
ones from professionals with expertise in financial markets (Carrió, 2016). 
Table  2. Reputation Quotient (RQ). Source: Author’s own elaborations based on data from Carreras et al, 2013 
and Carrió, 2016. 
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The Reputational Quotient is a better alternative to the ones based on ranking system. It 
became a reference when developing new assessment rates afterwards (Carreras, Alloza 
and Carreras, 2013). 
The results on Reputational Quotient are published yearly in The Wall Street Journal 
(Alsop, 2004). 
RepTrak™ Index 
The RepTrak™ is the world’s largest and highest quality normative reputation database 
which was created as a response to the increasing demand on companies and institutions 
to have a better management on their intangibles (Reputation Institute, 2017;Carreras, 
Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
The Global RepTrak™ 100 is a study conducted by the Reputation Institute. This 
institute was founded in 1997 by Dr. Charles Fombrun and Dr. Cees van Riel 
(Reputation Institute, 2017).  
Annually a study is performed to measure global reputation of the world’s 100 most 
highly-regarded and familiar global companies in 15 countries using RepTrak 
framework aiming to protect reputations of that companies as well as to analyze risks 
and drive their competitive advantage (Reputation Institute, 2017).  
Firms included in the study follow some necessary qualifications: (1) have significant 
economic presence in the 15 largest economies, (2) have an above average reputation in 
its home country; and finally (3) have a global familiarity over 40% (Reputation 
Institute, 2017). 
This system takes into account seven key rational dimensions to measure the ability of 
the company to comply with stakeholder’s expectations. Thus, it connects emotional 
bonds of stakeholders with rational behaviours to determine the overall reputation of a 
company (Reputation Institute, 2017).  
The seven rational dimensions include the following factors: (1) Products and services, 
(2) Innovation, (3) Workplace, (4) Governance, (5) Citizenship, (6) Leadership, and 
finally (7) Financial Performance. Reputation benefits derived from supportive 
behaviours are: purchase, recommendation, crisis proof, verbal support, investment and 
work (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013; Reputation Institute, 2017). 
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According to RepTrak™, companies with excellent or strong reputations get significally 
more support from the public. Indeed, in 2017, companies in the Top Ten position 
where from United States (The Walt Disney Company, Google and Intel), Japan (Canon 
and Sony) and Germany (Bosch and Adidas) (Reputation Institute, 2017). 
The top three global drivers are Products and services which is the most important one, 
followed by Governance and Citizenship (Reputation Institute, 2017). 
Apart from awareness, it is relevant the reinforcement of emotional bonds from 
consumers with the company, thus, increase company’s familiarity which is a powerful 
reputation driver for companies and markets (Reputation Institute, 2017). 
It is an index with great validity and predictive essence that helps managing effectively 
corporate reputation (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013).  
To sum up, the RepTrak™ pulse is the global measurement of RepTrak™ that assesses 
relevant supportive behaviours of the industry. Overall, it is a powerful tool to be used 
when measuring (1) the assessment of corporate reputation based on perceptions by 
both specialized stakeholders and by the general public; as well as to (2) make 
comparisons of corporate reputations across stakeholders groups and finally to (3) make 
cross-cultural comparisons on this field (Reputation Institute, 2017). 
2.4.2. Factors to be measured 
Profitability 
According to Fombrun (1996), investors pay a lot of attention to ‘A company’s 
profitability, volatility and indebtedness to gauge its future prospects and assess its 
attractiveness’.  
There are three important traits to keep in mind regarding profitability dimension. The 
first one has to do with earnings generation. The ability to generate strong earnings 
steadily increases company’s attractiveness to investors due to a rise on company’s 
market value as well as corporate reputation capital. Consequently, it is important to 
keep certain level of earnings in order to project a healthy and profitable situation, and, 
therefore, keep or even increase the number of investors (Fombrun, 1996). 
27 
 
The second trait relies on stability. Company’s environment is constantly changing, 
generating a lot of uncertainty. This uncertainty is reflected in investors’ risk position 
such that the expected returns have to be above the average to compensate it. Hence, it 
is crucial to maintain stability in order to be able to deliver the level of returns expected. 
Indeed, earnings and risk are main factors to determine ratings on reputation by 
investors and analysts (Fombrun, 1996).  
Finally, the third trait is related to the way in which companies project their positive 
prospects for growth. Certainly, this issue is complex to be figured out. The ratio 
between company’s stock price over earnings (p/e) is a common tool used by investors 
since the higher the p/e ratio, the better the prospects with respect to rivals (Fombrun, 
1996). 
Product quality 
Fombrun (1996) pointed out that ‘Products that sell have more customers, and so brand 
revenues gauge the brand’s popularity’. This fact is considered to be a guarantee of 
product visibility. For instance, Procter & Gamble is one of the companies that produce 
the most popular consumer products (Fombrun, 1996).  
Accordingly, quality is a key distinctive on a company’s products that affects 
consumer’s preferences and it can have a direct impact on market share, profitability 
and growth prospects as well if consumer’s preferences are set on quality products 
(Fombrun, 1996).  
Moreover, quality is not only inherent in the product but also in the customer care. This 
encompasses a regular contact with the customer to gather and provide information as 
well on satisfaction or dissatisfaction, possible questions or other issues related to the 
product, its use, its results and potential improvements to be done.  
To sum up, it is necessary to keep in touch with customers in order to enhance 
company’s strategy and understand needs to be covered. Nevertheless, this consumer 
tracking must be well-managed in order not to be paying excessive attention to 
customers such that the company lose clients or they complain about it (Fombrun, 
1996). 
 
28 
 
Employee treatment 
It is basic to promote trust in order to foster the accessibility to information to everyone. 
To do so, many companies use profit-sharing plans and stock ownership to employees 
such that some kind of commitment by the employees’ side is created. In that way, 
employees also become shareholders of the company (Fombrun, 1996). 
Furthermore, to encourage employees’ empowerment is also a factor taken into account 
when determining company’s reputation. This has a lot to do with internal structure of 
the company, in other words, the degree of freedom and active participation of 
employees in decision making (Fombrun, 1996).  
The type of relationship with company’s employees outlines the level of effort and 
involvement the workforce which will be reflected in company’s performance and 
reputation as well (Fombrun, 1996).  
Overall, factors such as motivation, training, promotion opportunities, autonomy, 
involvement and working conditions play an important role regarding employee 
treatment dimension. 
Corporate governance 
This dimension is linked with the internal structure of the company and the degree of 
hierarchy in decision making.  
Environmental and Social responsibility 
Social and environmental responsibility is considered to be a differentiating element 
specifically linked with reputation.  
In this case priorities will differ from the ones held by investors or employees since, in 
accordance to Fombrun’s words (1996), ‘From public’s point of view, doing good is a 
precursor of doing well’. 
The responsibility associated to social and environmental issues has to do with serving 
the community and going green, respectively. Therefore, it engages the company with 
the community. Indeed, this commitment is mostly present in every reputation index 
since it is considered to be an identity reputational trait. Again, for example the case 
29 
 
Procter & Gamble which recognized the challenge to contribute actively with 
communities by fostering partnerships to improve products’ dimensions – related to 
safety and production process– or promoting environmental quality management by 
redesigning the distribution process (Fombrun, 1996; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 
2013).  
Actually, the RepTrak® index reflects social and environmental responsibility through 
three indicators – commitment with good causes, positive influence on the society and 
care of the environment’s protection (Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
2.5. Theories regarding Corporate Reputation 
According to Walker (2010), the most common theories that have been used to examine 
corporate reputation are Signalling Theory, Institutional theory and Resource-Based 
View Theory.  
However, apart from the ones presented above, other not so common theories have been 
used on the corporate reputation field such as Stakeholder Theory, Social Identity 
Theory, Game Theory or Social Cognition (Walker, 2010). Therefore, corporate 
reputation could be examined from many different perspectives which imply high 
complexity when trying to integrate them and create a common approach (Walker, 
2010). 
The three most common ones will be displayed next: Signalling theory, Institutional 
theory, and Resource Based View theory following a time-lapse of how they move from 
pre-action, to-action or to post-action. 
Signalling theory 
Signalling theory deals with the organizational image projected aiming to build, sustain 
and preserve corporate reputation.  
Actually, it deals with information asymmetries. In 1973, Michael Spencer provided a 
formulation of signalling theory of the job-market as a function of education level. In 
the recruitment process, there are information asymmetries since employers do not have 
all information about the actual quality of candidates. In consequence, education level 
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acts as a signal of this quality since low-skilled candidates would not be capable of 
getting higher levels of education. Therefore, education is a signal that allows a 
reduction of information asymmetries (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and R. Reutzel, 2011). 
Thus, it analyses strategic decisions and choices made by the firm in order to send 
specific signals to the environment. In that way, it examines how these signals are 
perceived by constituents since stakeholders based their impressions on these signals. 
Then, signalling theory is assessing the corporate social performance of the company 
and how it is reflected on its reputation. This theory is applied in the action stage 
(Walker, 2010).  
Overall, signalling theory analyses the signals sent and detected by firms, the reason 
behind the signals and the way they are sent (Ponzi, Fombrun and Gardberg, 2011). 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory considers what brings legitimacy to the firm and therefore, the effort 
done by the firm in the building reputation process. Thus, it refers to the institutional 
field and the actions taken by the firm in this field as well (Walker, 2010). 
It is considered to be in the pre-action or action phase. Furthermore, there are relevant 
variables to keep in mind, for instance, sustainability in terms of product and service, as 
well as, possible influence that it exerts on firm’s reputation (Walker, 2010). 
Overall, institutional theory remarks the significance of the institutional environment 
and context on the field of corporate reputation (Walker, 2010).  
Resource Based View 
It was created by Birger Wernerfelt in 1984. It is a complex theory to be implemented 
which is actually implemented in the post-action phase. The firm has the ability to 
manage its resources and capacities such that it achieves a competitive advantage 
sustainable in the long run, thus, it examines how valuable and rare is reputation leading 
to an upgraded position (Walker, 2010; Carreras, Alloza, Carreras, 2013).  
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The Resource Based View theory (RBV) examines reputation according to the V.R.I.O. 
properties2. It considers reputation as a valuable and rare intangible which is a scarce 
resource difficult to imitate and it must be sufficiently favourable such that it can turn to 
be a source of distinction for the company. Furthermore, it is essential to achieve a 
competitive advantage position (Walker, 2010; Carreras, Alloza and Carreras, 2013). 
The company must know very well how to manage this resource, by evaluating 
strengths and weaknesses, such that the company applies the most appropriate policies 
to boost it.  
Therefore, the company can get a source of profitability from the competitive advantage 
that results of a great management of all resources, through the combination of human 
and material ones. Overall, companies must analyse and foster their strategic resources 
to enhance its profitability (Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Walker, 2010; Carreras, Alloza 
and Carreras, 2013).  
Overall, the Resource Based View theory is the one that better encompasses all five 
attributes from corporate reputation presented before3. 
  
                                                 
2
 VRIO properties: an element is analysed taking into account four aspects: Value, Rarity, Imitability and 
Organizational Resources Sufficient.  
3
 See page 10. Corporate Reputation Attributes. 
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3. MERCO RANKING 
In this section, it will be displayed an overview of MERCO4 ranking, which provides an 
assessment of Corporate reputation of companies operating in Spain.  
The overview aims to provide a summary of MERCO’s evolution and some insights 
regarding different issues during the ten last years from 2007 to 2017. At glance, it 
includes detailed information of main companies, sectors with higher presence in the 
ranking as well as distinction of local and foreign companies.  
3.1. MERCO Overview of The Top Companies from  2007 to 2017 
3.1.1. Ranking Overview: Main companies from 2007 to 2017 
The evolution of the companies placed in the top 10 positions is shown in figure 3. 
Next, it will be displayed a brief company’s description and its evolution assessment 
during the time period analysed.  
Inditex is a vertically integrated Spanish holding of companies specialised in retail, 
textile manufacturing and distribution, with more than 150.000 employees and present 
worldwide. It includes brands such as ZARA, Oysho, Bershka or Massimo Dutti. 
Actually, it has remarkable stability being the consecutive leader of the ranking from 
2012 onwards.  
Following the same trend, Mercadona is a Spanish distribution family-owned company 
with more than 1.600 supermarkets and 74.000 employees. Its business model is based 
on proximity commerce and white label products combined with few branded ones. It 
has gained presence in the top of the ranking scaling up positions gradually approaching 
and keeping in the second place in MERCO’s ranking since 2012.  
The third position since 2013 belongs to Santander, a Spanish banking group with a 
network of financial entities all around the globe, mainly in Europe and Latin America. 
Before 2013, other companies were ranked in the third position such as Telefónica, 
Repsol, El Corte Inglés or the current leader Inditex.  
                                                 
4 See page 18. Measurement of Corporate Reputation: MERCO ranking. 
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Telefónica is a Spanish telecommunications multinational company considered one of 
the most important one in Europe and the fifth worldwide in the telecommunications 
sector. I was placed in the third top position of the most well assessed companies in 
Spain in 2007. Currently, it occupies the sixth position far from the first position in 
2010. 
Repsol is a Spanish integrated global company from the oil and gas industry that has 
around 24.000 employees.  It has kept stable record in the ranking being placed mainly 
in the fourth position during these 10 years period analysis, except from 2009 to 2012 
when it occupied the sixth and the third one respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of most well-assessed companies in MERCO ranking from 2007 to 2017. Source: Author’s own 
elaboration from MERCO ranking data. 
Companies comprised within the range from the fifth to tenth position are mainly from 
the banking sector such as BBVA and CaixaBank, both suffering a decrease in 2012 
and 2013 respectively up to 11th and 10th position. Furthermore, other companies 
belonging to different sectors, such as Iberdrola from the energy sector and Mapfre 
from the insurance one, are also comprised within that range. Mapfre has followed a 
scaling up trend from 14th to 8th position within that 10 year time period. 
The range comprised between the tenth and twentieth position includes some well-
known foreign companies which are gaining positions such as Google and Apple from 
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the technological sector.Moreover, other companies such Coca-Cola Company, Ikea 
and Indra are also present in the top of the ranking following a less stable trend. 
3.1.2. Ranking’s stability: Top 10 companies between 2007 and 2017 
Companies 
Average 
punctuation 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Inditex 9931 179,66 9405 10000 
Santander 8745 772,38 7224 10000 
Telefónica 8741 704,81 7880 10000 
Repsol 8368 434,15 7384 8999 
Mercadona 8320 1695,73 4738 9969 
CaixaBank 7884 741,95 6792 9066 
Iberdrola 7855 804,38 5880 8885 
BBVA 7810 346,72 7228 8173 
El Corte Inglés 7692 1329,63 5910 10000 
Mapfre 6558 1265,96 4370 7771 
Google 5955 2120,70 1448 7806 
 
Table  3. MERCO’s data on the top 10 companies (2007-2017). Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
Table 3 summarizes some statistical data regarding the stability of the ten top 
companies present in the MERCO ranking. 
As it happened in figure 3, Inditex shows the best results, therefore, being the leader of 
the ranking. Indeed, it presents an average punctuation of 9.931 points, very close to the 
maximum score possible, which corresponds to 10.000 points and that it reached several 
times from 2012 onwards. Moreover, it has the lowest standard deviation of 179,66. 
Finally, its great performance led it to get a minimum score of 9.405, still very close to 
the maximum allowed.  
The third most well assessed company in 2017, again making reference to figure 3, is 
Santander which shows the second best results with an average punctuation of 8.745 
and a standard deviation far from the one of Inditex with 772,38 points. Despite this, its 
minimum punctuation is 7.224 points and, as well as the leader, its maximum score 
from 2011 is 10.000 points.  
Telefónica, as Inditex and Santander, also reached a maximum of 10.000 points, 
following a similar trend to Santander, with an average score of 7841, a standard 
deviation of 704,81 and its minimum score of 7.880, even higher that Santander’s 
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minimum score. Repsol and Mercadona present an average punctuation very close to 
each other of 8.368 and 8.320 points respectively. In contrast, to Mercadona’s standard 
deviation which is the second highest one with a value of 1.695,73, Repsol’s standard 
deviation is the lowest one, except from the one of Inditex, with 434,45 due to its 
stability throughout the years always fluctuating between the 3rd and the 6th position5. 
Regarding their minimum and maximum, Repsol’s minimum is higher than 
Mercadona’s one, with 7.384 and 4.738 points, yet Mercadona achieved a greater 
maximum score of almost 1.000 points of difference higher than Repsol, getting 9.969 
versus 8.999 points of Repsol. 
The companies belonging to the banking sector present similar values, except from the 
ones of the standard deviation. In this case, CaixaBank and BBVA, they showed an 
average punctuation of 7.884 and 7.810 points, a minimum of 6.792 and 7.228 points, 
respectively, and a maximum of 9.066 for CaixaBank and 8.173 points for BBVA. 
Overall, Caixabank excels on the average punctuation and on its maximum, but BBVA 
has a lowest standard deviation of 346,72, almost a half of the one from CaixaBank 
which is 741,95. BBVA also has better minimum score around 430 points higher.  
In the case of Iberdrola, it follows a similar trend to the one presented by Caixabank, 
with an average score of 7.855, a high standard deviation exceeding 800, concretely, 
804,38. Its minimum and maximum scores are 5.880 from 2007 and 8.885 points from 
2010.  
The two companies with lowest average score are Mapfre and Google with 6.558 and 
5.955 points each one. These two firms present a high standard deviation, greater than 
1.000, concretely, 1.265,96 for Mapfre and the highest one for Google of 2.120,70. 
Indeed, Google presents a fluctuant pattern over years from 2010 to 2017, as observed 
in figure 3.  Finally, despite the fact that Mapfre shows a minimum of 4.370 points, 
which is much higher than the 1.448 points scored by Google, this last one has a greater 
but closer maximum score of 7.806 points in contrast to the 7.771 points of Mapfre.  
Finally, it is very interesting the case of El Corte Inglés, in which we will focus on in 
the following sections. It presents an average punctuation quite similar to the one of 
BBVA with 7.692 points. Nevertheless, its standard deviation is really high, indeed, the 
                                                 
5 See figure 3. 
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third highest with a value of 1.329,63. As well as the leading companies, El Corte Inglés 
reached the maximum score of a leader, 10.000 points. However, its minimum 
punctuation is far from the leading ones getting almost 6.000, concretely 5.910 points.  
3.2. Sector distribution overview between 2007 and 2017 
Regarding the distribution of the ranking in accordance to the sector where companies 
belong, there are some sectors that present specific features during the period from 2007 
to 2017.  
The leading sectors of the ranking are mainly Banking sector, Technological one; and 
Infrastructures, construction and services. However, since 2013 onwards, new sectors 
have gained presence such as Clothing and retail as well as Generalised distribution. 
 
Figure 4. Sector distribution overview from 2007 to 2017. Source: Author’s elaboration from MERCO’s ranking 
data. 
First of all, as observed in figure 4, we provide a general view of the three main sectors 
presented before.  
The Banking sector represents the biggest share but also the greatest instability of the 
ranking.  It accounted for more than 12 companies during the primary years of the 
period analysed, which coincides with the beginning of the economic crisis from 2007 
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to 2009. Actually, in 2009 it represented 14%6 of total sectoral distribution. However, 
from 2010 onwards, the reputational assessment of companies belonging to that sector 
dropped, which implied an overwhelming reduction of companies from the banking 
sector present in the ranking. Despite this fact, currently, it is still a leading sector which 
gained positions in 2016 accounting for 10 banking companies such as Santander or 
BBVA both in the third and fifth position respectively7. 
Regarding the Technological sector, the first period from 2007 to 2010 presented a 
stable trend in which this sector accounted for more than 6 technological companies. 
However, during the following years, there is a constant down sloping trend, where just 
two technological companies remain as well-assessed in the top of the ranking, the case 
of the big players Apple and Google as shown previously in figure 3.  
The Infrastructures, construction and services sector presents higher stability than 
the two sectors presented before. Actually, there is an up-scaling trend during years, 
reaching its maximum in 2016 when its representation augmented from 6% in 2007 to 
9% in 20168. Some companies within this sector are Abertis which was ranked in the 
48th position in the ranking of 2016 as well as AENA and Acciona ranked in the 35th and 
38th position respectively in 20179. Therefore, in this case the importance of the sector is 
not given by the most-well assessed companies, as it happened in previous sectors, but 
by the increasing number of companies related to that area. 
Furthermore, there are other categories that also show interesting patterns, for instance 
the Generalised distribution with companies such as Carrefour or Amazon. This 
category shows an increase of 3% from 2013 onwards10. Moreover, as observed in 
Figure 4, from 2010 on, there are more than 4 companies of this sector. This fact may 
be due to an increase of e-commerce through retailers such as Amazon. Here, we make 
special mention of El Corte Inglés which dropped considerably in 2014 until the 32nd 
position, far away from the top ones it was used to be placed in. This specific issue will 
be addressed in depth in the following sections. 
                                                 
6 See Figure A3 on the Appendix 2.  
7 See figure 3.  
8 See Appendix 2.  
9 See Appendix 1.  
10See Appendix 2.  
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Besides, Energy, gas and water sector exhibits a great stability through years with 
around 4 to 6 companies present in the MERCO ranking including Repsol, placed 
almost these 10 years in the fourth position11; or Iberdrola, also included in the top ten 
companies of MERCO. Actually, this category represents about 4% to 6%12. 
Telecommunications is following the same trend but with lesser presence in the ranking.  
Finally, it is remarkable the patterns presented by Clothing and retail, Automotive and 
Tourism and hostelry.  
Firstly, Clothing and retail moved from a stable period to almost the triple since 2013. 
Here, Inditex is the consecutive leader since 2012 placed in the 1st position13 of the most 
well assessed companies reaching a punctuation near or even equal to 10.000 points14. 
In addition to it, other companies such as MANGO, Nike or Desigual also belong to that 
sector. 
The Automotive sector is up-sloped since 2011 onwards. Indeed, in that year some 
companies such as Toyota and BMW entered in the ranking. Currently, they are valued 
in the 56th and 49th position respectively. Generally, in both cases, they followed a 
positive evolution over the years scaling up positions reaching their maximum 
punctuations in 2014 and in 2016, respectively, for Toyota in the 33rd position and for 
BMW positioned in the 40th place15.  
Regarding the Tourism and hostelry, it follows a down sloping trend reducing its 
presence on the sector from 5% in 2012 to 2% in 201716.  
The final remark deals with the Real Estate sector which, as shown in figure 4, does 
not have any company accounting for it since 2007, a year previous to the early stage of 
the economic crisis.  
  
                                                 
11 See Figure 3. 
12 See Appendix 2.  
13 See Figure 3. 
14 See table 3.  
15 See Appendix 1. Overview of the top100 companies included in MERCO ranking from 2007 to 2017  
16 See Appendix 3. Sector distribution of the top 100 companies from 2007 to 2017. 
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3.3. Local Versus Foreign Presence 
It is important to recall that the ranking does not only include local but also foreign 
firms operating in Spain. Hence, the yearly percentage of local and foreign firms have 
been summarised below in table 3.  
It is possible to distinguish that during the whole period comprised from 2007 to 2017, 
more than 60% of companies are local ones. However, this percentage is reduced as 
time goes by, since at the beginning, in 2007, almost 69% of companies where Spanish 
ones, meanwhile since 2013 onwards, the ratio does not exceed the 64%. Indeed, in 
2015, it was recorded the highest portion of foreign companies included in MERCO 
ranking accounting for 39%, and therefore, the lowest fraction of local ones accounting 
for 61%.  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Local 69% 68% 66% 66% 65% 69% 63% 64% 61% 62% 62% 
Foreign 31% 32% 34% 34% 35% 31% 37% 36% 39% 38% 38% 
 
Table  4. Percentage of Companies: Local versus Foreign. Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
Actually, there are some sectors that during the period analysed (2007-2017) showed a 
higher dominance of foreign companies. As shown in Figure 5, on average foreign 
companies are mainly leaders in Automotive, Electronics, Information and software; 
Audit and Drugstore and perfume.  
 
Figure 5. Main foreign dominating sectors on average in MERCO Ranking during 2007-2017. 
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Nevertheless, in the case of technological sector, foreign and local companies on 
average are almost present in the same proportion such as Gamesa and Siemens. In 
contrast, generalised distribution shows the reverse pattern.  
3.4. Overall Ranking Stability 
The environment is constantly changing, as well as companies’ presence in the MERCO 
ranking. Companies’ positions fluctuate in accordance to the score achieved when being 
assessed on many criteria, such that some companies exit to enter new ones.  
As figure 5 shows,  20% of companies are only present in the ranking just once such as 
AXA, ONO or ESTEVE.  In contrast,  24% of companies stayed during the whole period 
from 2007 to 2017, such as the leader Inditex, Repsol or Google.  
Despite this fact, almost 
more than 50% of 
companies do not stay 
longer than 5 years in the 
ranking, or they are present 
in the ranking since 2012. 
Indeed, 9% are present for 
2 years and 10% for 3 
years such as Ericsson, 
Renault or Tarradellas. A 
5% of companies in the 
ranking stay or are present 
for 4 years; and 9% for 5 
years, as the case of BP Oil 
and Amazon.   
 
Hence, 47% of companies in the ranking are there for six or more years. Actually, as the 
number of years that companies are present in the ranking increase, from six to nine, the 
percentage of companies’ continuity decreases, except for those of eight years such as 
Volkswagen Group, Apple or La Fageda.  
20%
9%
10%
5%
9%
8%
4%
7%
2%
2%
24%
Percentage of companies according to the 
years present in the top 100 ranking from 
2007 to 2017
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Figure 6. Percentage of companies according to the years present in the 
top 100 ranking during the period of 2007-2017. Source: Author’s own 
elaboration. 
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Overall, the companies of the ranking follow two patterns: (1) they are present there for 
5 or less years, may be due to early emergent activity, such as the case of Amazon 
which is growing currently, or may be due to obsolescence such as Ericsson; (2) They 
are strong companies capable to sustain stable reputational value over time. 
4. EL CORTE INGLÉS 
The case study about El Corte Inglés displayed in this section contains corporate and 
financial data from the company obtained from company’s website as well as annual 
reports published by the company, MERCO ranking and from SABI database.  
4.1. About the company 
4.1.1. Description of the company 
El Corte Inglés is a Spanish familiar distribution group from the retail sector 
headquartered in Madrid. The majority of shareholders belong to the founder’s family, 
Ramón Areces, and to its foundation Fundación Ramón Areces (Díaz, 2014). 
The group is composed by eight different business lines: El Corte Inglés which is the 
core business; Hipercor, Supercor, Viajes El Corte Inglés, Óptica 2000, Insurance 
group, Sfera and Bricor. Currently, El Corte Inglés is present all over the Spanish 
territory with more than 90 establishments and it expanded its operations also to 
Portugal with an overall workforce of 91.690 employees (El Corte Inglés. 2018). 
 
Figure 7. Number of centers by business line. Source: El Corte Inglés (2018).  
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4.1.2. Company background17 
Company’s name comes from a small tailor shop acquired by the founder of the 
company in 1935, which was located in Madrid since 1890.  
Afterwards, El Corte Inglés was founded in June 28th of 1940 by Ramón Areces with 
the support of his uncle, who would become partner and president; César Rodríguez. By 
that year, the company had just 7 employees.  
During the 70’s until the 90’s, El Corte Inglés began its national expansion to 
Barcelona, Sevilla or Bilbao showing a modern image to satisfy needs and demands 
through a diversified commercial activity.  
Ramón Areces was succeeded by Isidoro Álvarez in 1989, after the founder’s death. 
Under the management of Isidodo Álvarez, the company achieved great growth and 
business expansion.  
Isidoro Álvarez died in September of 2014. He was succeeded by Dimas Gimeno 
Álvarez who is currently in charge of El Corte Inglés.  
4.1.3. Corporate strategy 
El Corte Inglés is focused mainly on client’s orientation policy and innovation. To do 
so, they have a diversified market portfolio with differentiated business lines within the 
group. In that way, it is capable of offering a wide range of products and services to its 
customers (El Corte Inglés, 2018).  
El Corte Inglés has a strong business model based on constant innovation, as well as 
adaptation to upcoming trends and consumers’ needs through its broad assortment. 
Indeed, the company’ principles include: Guarantee and Service as a main source of 
growth; Ethics and Responsibility building trust and reputation; Relation and 
interaction with the agents of the environment, keeping in mind all groups of interest;  
and, finally, the Commitment with the environment (El Corte Inglés, 2018).  
                                                 
17 See Appendix 4. El Corte Inglés timeline. 
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Regarding its client’s orientation policy, the company is highly engaged to it on five 
different dimensions: (1) Quality, (2) Assortment, (3) Service, (4) Specialisation; and 
(5) Guarantee. These five dimensions converge to the maximum clients’ satisfaction and 
the differentiated image that the company aims to project (El Corte Inglés, 2018). 
Overall, El Corte Inglés is considered as a leader in department store in Europe as well 
as a referent in Spanish distribution (El Corte Inglés, 2018). 
4.2. El Corte Inglés by MERCO 
In this section we analyse in depth El Corte Inglés in accordance to MERCO ranking by 
looking at the evolution during the period from 2007 to 2017, as well as the evolution of 
sector to which it belongs. Moreover, we also show some insights of El Corte Inglés’s 
leadership style by analysing the leaders’ ranking available in MERCO’s website, called 
MERCO Líderes.  
4.2.1. Evolution of El Corte Inglés 
During the primary years of the period analysed, the company presents well-assessed 
reputational levels being positioned between the 1st and the 5th position of the ranking. 
Indeed, as observed in figure 7, its best year was 2007 when it was placed in the 1st 
position and valued with 10.000 points. From 2009 to 2013, there is a shift to lower 
positions fluctuating between the 6th and the 15th place with an average score of 7.732 
points.  
     Figure 8. Evolution of El Corte Inglés from 2007 to 2017. Author’s own elaboration from MERCO ranking. 
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After 2013, there is a huge decrease in the ranking until the 32nd position and 5.910 
points reached in 2014. It is then, when there is an inflection point shifting to a positive 
up-scaling trend. Therefore, since 2014, El Corte Inglés is making up for the years of 
lower reputational score. Currently, it is placed in the 17th position and it is close to 
reach the average score from the period between 2010 and 2012.  
4.2.2. Evolution of the sector: Generalised distribution 
El Corte Inglés is classified, according to MERCO criteria, on the sector of generalised 
distribution.  
Regarding the evolution of the sector, the figure 8 shows data collected from MERCO 
Sectors, looking concretely to the one that includes all companies dedicated to 
generalised distribution. Therefore, the figure below illustrates which are the main 
companies between 2007 and 2017 and how they switched positions in the ranking.  
 
 
Figure 9. Evolution overview of the Generalised Distribution sector from 2007 to 2017. Author’s own elaboration 
from MERCO ranking. 
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In the top of the ranking there are mainly two companies who switched their positions 
in 2011. These companies are El Corte Inglés for the first period, in the early stage of 
the crisis (2008-2010); and then, Mercadona, the company of Juan Roig, which has 
been the second main company until 2011, when it became the first one until now.  
It is very interesting the fact that El Corte Inglés remains in the second position on this 
ranking from 2011 onwards, since recalling previous section discussed, it dropped 
significantly, exactly in 2014, on the general MERCO ranking that included other 
sectors. Moreover, referring to MERCO Sectors again, El Corte Inglés presented the 
ability to remain stable with the entry of new companies mainly since 201318 such as 
DIA, Consum or Amazon. The reason behind this fact could be its wide and diversified 
range of products that will be explained next.  
Carrefour and Eroski are continuously moving around the 3rd and 4th position, also since 
2011, the same year as the leaders stated before. In the next years, these companies 
together with DIA, which enters in the ranking in 2012, are constantly switching 
positions, following a down-sloping trend for the two oldest companies, Carrefour and 
Eroski. However, Carrefour had the ability to scale-up positions being in the 4th one in 
2017.  
In 2015, the foreign company Amazon and the local one Consum entered in the ranking. 
Despite this, they followed completely different trends, since Amazon has been very 
stable over years keeping always its initial 3rd position; meanwhile Consum is 
approaching lower positions in a short period of time. Concretely, in one year it fell 
almost to the 10th place.  
Alcampo, a company from the Auchan French retail group, was present on the ranking 
in the 5th position during three years, from 2008 to 2010. Even though it disappeared, in 
2017, the Auchan group has again presence in the ranking, exactly in the 7th place.  
Overall, it is important to remark that the number of companies in the sector has 
increased during the period analysed. Furthermore, it is interesting to highlight the new 
entrance of companies such as Wallapop which has expanded a lot its business that was 
initially based on a platform where individuals could buy and sell second hand products.  
                                                 
18 See figure 4.  
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To sum up, companies whose business model is based on e-commerce are gaining 
popularity and reputation, such as Amazon or, again, Wallapop, threatening the business 
strategy of traditional ones being forced to include also this online shopping possibility. 
4.2.3. Leadership ranking  
Leadership and proper management practices are essential to build up strong corporate 
reputation.19 
                                                 
19 Dimas Gimeno is not ranked as one top leader, but it is important as the successor of Isidoro Álvarez. 
Leader Company 
Emilio Botín Santander 
Amancio Ortega Inditex 
Juan Roig Mercadona 
Isidoro Álvarez El Corte Inglés 
César Alierta Telefónica 
Antonio Brufau Repsol 
Ignacio Sánchez Iberdrola 
Isidre Fainé CaixaBank 
Francisco González BBVA 
Pablo Isla Inditex 
Ana P. Botín Santander 
Dimas R. Gimeno20 El Corte Inglés 
 
Table  5. Leaders and companies. Source: Author’s own 
elaboration. 
 
 
As shown in figure 9 and looking also to table 
5, it is possible to distinguish that all 
companies ranked with high scores were, and 
are still being managed by well-assessed 
leaders in the ranking of MERCO Líderes.  
For instance, we can focus on the three main 
top companies, Inditex, Mercadona and 
Santander. 
 
Figure 10. Top leaders by MERCO Líderes ranking scores 
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Firstly, Amancio Ortega founder of Inditex, who has a score higher than 9.000 points 
for all years. Pablo Isla, also from Inditex, began with a score lower than 3.000 points 
and from 2010 on, he increase its score almost reaching the 10.000 points. 
In addition, following the same trend, there are Mercadona and Santander with Juan 
Roig and Emilio Botín ahead, respectively. Santander’s leader was succeeded by Ana 
Patrícia Botín in 2015, after the death of the previous leader. Since then, her score has 
raised up significantly moving from a maximum of 5.000 points to more than 9.000 
points.  In the case of Juan Roig, he followed a regular up-sloping trend until 
approaching the maximum score levels since 2015. 
In contrast to the pattern showed by the rest of companies represented in the chart, the 
leader of El Corte Inglés, Isidoro Álvarez, presented a decreasing score over the years 
until he died in 2014. This fact is supported by the evolution of El Corte Inglés in the 
overall ranking, where it presents a negative evolution achieving its lowest score in 
2014 and being placed in the 32nd position20.  
From 2015 onwards, El Corte Inglés management was in charge of Dimas R. Gimeno, 
who has reversed the tendency of the last leader, showing a regularly increasing trend 
over the years.  
4.3. Financial Analysis 
4.3.1. Data Collection 
The data collection process has been structured in two sections. The first part consists 
on corporate information gathered from two different sources of information. On one 
hand, some data belongs to the annual reports published by the company on its website. 
On the other hand, since the annual reports did not include all the information of the 
company we have gathered it on SABI database21. 
The second section corresponds to a selection of news related to El Corte Inglés. The 
news collection is focused on the period from 2013 onwards, when the company strove 
                                                 
20 See Appendix 1. Table A1. 
21 SABI database: Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos which includes financial information about 
Spanish and Portuguese companies.  
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to achieve better results. It aims to provide some insight and support the economic data 
analysed in section one. In order to so, they have been classified according to the 
information provided on five main issues: Business model, which includes the 
company’s management style; Ownership structure, which is related to El Corte 
Inglés shareholders; Performance, Strategic management, and Future prospects.  
Overall, it will provide the evolution of the company in terms of company’s financial 
structure (Assets, equity and liabilities) as well as in operational terms for instance 
revenue, net profit and more. This information will be useful to develop a profitability 
analysis based on Return on Equity (ROE), Debt-to-Equity, Return on Assets (ROA), 
Fixed-Asset Turnover, and the evolution and distribution of revenues, net profit and 
investment.  
4.3.2. Financial ratios 
The Return on Equity (ROE) is considered one of the most important financial ratios 
as well as one of the best indicators of company’s profitability. It is the amount of net 
income returned as a percentage of shareholders equity which reveals how much profit a 
company earned in comparison to the total amount of shareholders’ equity, in other 
words, how much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have 
invested (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 2014; Ross, Westerfield, and Bradford, 2010). 
The general formula to find the ROE is as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
Return on Equity is composed by three main components: Profit Margin, Asset 
Turnover Ratio and Equity Multiplier.  
The breakdown of Return on Equity formula is known as DuPont Analysis which 
allows checking the three different dimensions affecting ROE (Bodie et al, 2014; Ross 
et al, 2010). 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ∗ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑟    
 Profit margin: it reveals information about operating efficiency. It measures 
what part of revenue is kept as profit. A high profit margin would be a sign of 
(1) 
(2) 
49 
 
well-managed costs in comparison to competitors. In the same way, low profit 
margin percentage may be a sign of high expenditure relative to revenue, in 
other words, uncertain profitability.  
 Asset Turnover ratio: it shows to what extent assets are effectively generating 
revenue. It allows checking possible improvement or deterioration in assets 
performance. The higher the ratio, the better the company is performing. 
 Equity multiplier: it provides information about financial leverage, thus, the 
way company’s operations are financed through debt or equity. In this case, the 
higher the ratio, the higher the debt financing the assets of the company. 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
∗
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
The interpretation of the ROE value varies across industries and other macroeconomic 
factors. On average it is around 10% and 12% , actually, the desirable percentage moves 
between 12% and 15%. However, the higher the ROE is not always the better. It 
depends whether the high value obtained is based on high financial leverage or not, 
since a high financial leverage may compromise the solvency of the company (Bodie et 
al, 2014; Ross et al, 2010). 
The Debt-to-Equity ratio (D/E) provides a measurement on company’s financial 
leverage. Thus, it shows company’s debt used to finance its assets relative to 
shareholders’ equity. Hence, it compares total liabilities to shareholders’ equity. 
𝐷/𝐸 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
This ratio allows knowing how the company has financed its growth since the higher 
the debt/equity ratio, the higher the growth financed through debt. Therefore, it provides 
some insight on company’s borrowing dependence and risk. Generally, the optimal 
value of the ratio should not exceed 2 which would imply that two-thirds of the capital 
is financed by debt and just one-third by equity, in other words, the money borrowed 
double company’s funding. Actually, volatile earnings may be caused by high levels of 
risk are associated to aggressive leverage. 
(3) 
(4) 
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The Return on Assets (ROA) ratio indicates company’s profitability relative to total 
assets, in other words, company’s ability to generate earnings from invested capital, 
therefore, from company’s assets (Bodie et al, 2014; Ross et al, 2010). 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Return on assets can be also understood as return on investment. Indeed, this ratio can 
provide a picture of company’s efficacy on translating investment into net income.  
On general terms, the higher the ROA value, the better. This is because a high ROA 
number indicates that the company is gaining more money with lower investment 
showing solid performance in financial as well as in operational field. In the same way, 
a low ROA value may indicate little income in return from investment. Overall, it is 
useful for investors willing to invest in a company (Bodie et al, 2014; Ross et al, 2010). 
Indeed, both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA) project a clear 
picture of corporate  health of a company. Through these we will obtain a great 
overview on corporate health in the case of El Corte Inglés. 
The Fixed-Asset Turnover ratio measures operating performance by projecting a 
picture on company’s ability to generate revenues from fixed-assets investments also 
known as Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E). Thus, as in the case of ROA, it 
indicates revenue generation from investment, but in this case on fixed assets.  
𝑭𝒊𝒙𝒆𝒅 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕 𝑻𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃&𝐸
 
It will be useful to check earnings generation profitability from fixed assets of El Corte 
Inglés, including from huge department stores in key locations around Spain.  
Apart from the ratio analysis, the investment and revenues will also be studied. Firstly, 
investment will be analysed, its evolution and its distribution across material, intangible 
or financial assets.  Secondly, there is an assessment of revenues’ evolution and growth 
over the years, as well as in the case of net profit where we will compare sales relative 
to revenue per employee which indicates operating performance. 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔/𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆 𝒑𝒆𝒓 𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒐𝒚𝒆𝒆 =
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠
 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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All these data will be compared across years in order to obtain useful and conclusive 
inference since reference values vary across industries.  
To sum up, it will be linked to the results shown in MERCO ranking during the years 
between 2007 and 2017 and its significance on the media by looking at the news 
published.  
4.3.3. Results 
In this section it is displayed the results from the analysis of El Corte Ingles obtained 
from all data and ratios presented in previous section.  
To begin with, we analyse corporate situation through the years between 2007 and 2017 
by addressing to Return on Equity and Return on Assets ratios. 
Return on Equity 
Company’s profitability relative to its shareholders’ equity, there is a reduction of 
almost a half from 9,50% in 2007 to 4,94% in one year as shown in figure 11. This 
trend lasts during the following periods since ROE value continues decreasing over 
years until its lowest value of 1,50% in 2014.  
These low ratio values are a bad signal since the average Return on Equity value 
oscillates between 10% and 12%. Therefore, El Corte Inglés is far away from this 
average value which would imply that the net income generated from money invested 
by shareholders’ is almost insignificant, and it keeps reducing over years until 2015, 
when there is a little change in trends from down-sloping to up-sloping trend. Indeed, 
the lowest value corresponds to the year when the chairman, Isidoro Álvarez, at the age 
of 79 died.  
In order to obtain further details on company’s profitability relative to shareholders’ 
equity, we focus on the analysis of its three main components. In that way we can try to 
identify the reasons behind the constant down-sloping Return on Equity.  
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Figure 11. Return on Equity from 2007 to 2017. Author’s elaboration from SABI data. 
Components included in ROE ratio using DuPont analysis are displayed in table 6. 
ROE DuPont 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Profit margin 0,040 0,021 0,022 0,019 0,013 0,012 0,012 0,008 0,010 0,010 
Asset Turnover 1,262 1,001 0,935 0,928 0,879 0,819 0,792 0,798 0,829 0,853 
Equity multiplier 1,862 2,317 2,267 2,241 2,453 2,446 2,330 2,353 2,135 2,138 
 
Table  6. ROE applying DuPont analysis. 
Regarding profit margin ratio, it follows the same trend as the overall ROE ratio. 
Actually, the higher value corresponds to 2007 with a profit margin of 0.04, meanwhile 
in 2016 this value is four times lower being 0.01. Moreover, the lowest value 
corresponds to the year of the death of the chairman.  
The asset turnover ratio follows again the same pattern as the last one, profit margin. 
Its lowest value was also in 2014 with a ratio of 0.798.  Indeed, total assets value, which 
has been growing over years, exceeded by far the amount of revenues earned from 2009 
onwards22. 
In contrast, the equity multiplier keeps increasing over the years which imply that 
company’s financial leverage is getting higher. At the beginning of the period, in 2007, 
the equity multiplier accounted for 1.862 meanwhile at the end of 2016 it increased up 
to 2.138. In this case, the higher value corresponds to 2011 with a value of 2.453. Thus, 
company’s assets have been financed by debt over these years, being 2011 the year with 
the highest value of financial leverage. Despite this fact, from 2011 onwards, El Corte 
                                                 
22 See Appendix 5. Table A2. Balance sheet. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
ROE (1) 9,50% 4,94% 4,72% 3,99% 2,83% 2,32% 2,22% 1,50% 1,81% 1,87%
0,00%
2,00%
4,00%
6,00%
8,00%
10,00%
Return on Equity
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Inglés tried to reduce its financial leverage by accomplishing a reduction of around 
0.315 until 2016. 
Overall, it is possible to distinguish that the major component affecting negatively on 
Return on Equity value is the Equity multiplier. Moreover, El Corte Inglés presents low 
operating efficiency from revenues since it is only able to keep between 1% and 4% of 
revenues as earnings.  
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Regarding Assets performance, Return on Assets (ROA) ratio presents almost the 
same pattern as Return on Equity. In this case, it refers to returns from capital invested.  
By looking at figure 12, which summarizes ROA from 2007 to 2016, we can check that 
there is a huge decrease in company’s ability to generate earnings from its capital. 
When El Corte Inglés was leading the MERCO ranking, its ROA value accounted for 
5,10%, in contrast to the year 2014 when it reached the lowest ROA value of 0,64% and 
its lowest position on the ranking as well23.  
 
Figure 12. Return on Assets. Author’s own elaborations from SABI data. 
In 2008, the first year of the early stage of the crisis, is an inflection point because the 
value of revenues are almost equal to the value of total assets, in contrast to the past 
trends when revenues were higher than total value of company’s assets.  
However, from 2009 onwards, there is a shift where total assets are always greater than 
the value of revenues, being between 2012 and 2016, the time period with revenues 
                                                 
23 See Appendix 1. Table A1. 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
ROA 5,10% 2,13% 2,08% 1,78% 1,15% 0,95% 0,95% 0,64% 0,85% 0,87%
0,00%
1,00%
2,00%
3,00%
4,00%
5,00%
6,00%
Return on Assets
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much lower than total assets. Concretely, 2013 and 2014 are the years that show the 
worst results on ROA and ROE as well24.  
It is interesting to notice that, in 2008, despite the fact that both, Return on Equity and 
the Return on Assets suffered an important shift downwards; El Corte Inglés was able to 
keep in the third position of MERCO ranking. Actually, El Corte Inglés managed to be 
between the fifth top positions from 2007 and 2009, as well as, between the fifth and 
tenth position from 2010 to 2012. Despite the positions loss in MERCO ranking 
between 2013 and 2014, its worst years, it has been able to recover since 2015. This fact 
can be also seen on its Return on Assets and Equity ratios.   
Following with the analysis of company’s assets, we also computed the Fixed-Asset 
Turnover25, to know the ability of company’s fixed assets to generate earnings through 
Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE). 
 
Figure 13. Fixed-Asset Turnover. Source: Author’s elaboration from SABI data. 
As shown in Figure 13, earnings generation from assets dropped a lot between 2009 and 
2013. Actually, from 2007 to 2009, it dropped by almost 0.5. Since then onwards, it has 
kept a decreasing trend, being steeper between 2012 and 2013. However, during the last 
years there has been a recovery. 
  
                                                 
24 See Appendix 5. Table A2. 
25 Assumption: data available on SABI about Property, Plant and Equipment is already 
the net value after subtracting depreciation. 
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D/E 
Recalling financial leverage information revealed by equity multiplier of Return on 
Equity ratio, the Debt-to-Equity ratio also provides insights on financial leverage of 
the company. Indeed, the debt-to-equity does not exceed 2, it is between 1 and 1,45.  
 
Figure 14. Debt-to-Equity ratio. Source: Author’s own elaboration from SABI data. 
This implies that company’s growth has been financed almost by debt, and that El Corte 
Inglés is dependent on external financial sources, in other words, it has borrowing 
dependence.  
Hence, since Debt-to-Equity ratio compares total liabilities to Shareholders’ Equity, in 
the case of El Corte Inglés, it presents total liabilities higher that equity from the 
company. As shown in figure 14, the proportion of debt compared to shareholders’ 
equity has increased from 2007 to 2008 onwards. Actually, the years 2008, 2013 and 
2014, El Corte Inglés presented almost the same level of financial leverage near or 
equal to 1.35. This was mainly because in 2008 the crisis had a significant impact on the 
Spanish economy, and therefore on Spanish households as well, the main source of 
revenue of El Corte Inglés. In 2013 and 2014, El Corte Inglés was facing its worse 
years, financing its growth through debt, and facing the loss of its chairman Isidoro 
Álvarez in September of 2014. 
Nevertheless, in 2015 there is a reduction on the dependence on debt to finance 
company’s growth, which is directly linked to the entry of a new shareholder, a sheikh 
from Qatar, who invested 1.000 million euros in exchange of 10% of company’s shares. 
This deal triggered an argument within the counsel and the board of directors, since not 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
D/E 0,86 1,32 1,27 1,24 1,45 1,45 1,33 1,35 1,13 1,14
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
Debt-to-Equity
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all shareholders agreed with the conditions he established as shareholder and investor of 
the company. Indeed, sheikh’s proportion of shares could increase over the years if the 
performance of the company does not reach certain target amount established 
previously.  
Investment  
El Corte Inglés has been always well-known by its investment on new outstanding 
buildings in key locations around Spain. Indeed, it is located in strategic attractive 
places in the main capitals of Spain such as the case of El Corte Inglés from Catalunya 
Square in Barcelona or the one in Callao Square near to la Gran Vía in Madrid. The fact 
is that it is not only present in main capitals, but there is also establishments’ 
concentration around the territory. In general terms, in Madrid it has around 19 
establishments, in Barcelona it has 8 and in Zaragoza as well as in Valencia it has 4. 
Moreover, it has also expanded to Portugal, concretely to Oporto and Lisboa with one 
establishment in each place26. 
As a matter of fact, this strategy adopted by el Corte Inglés lead to high indebtedness 
and low profitable stores located in places not as crowded as big capitals where 
consumers visit department store regularly or there is great tourism. One example of 
this unprofitable building would be the case of El Corte Inglés in Getafe.   
  
Figure 15. Investment by El Corte Inglés between 2007 and 2017. Author’s own elaboration from El Corte Inglés 
annual reports. 
                                                 
26 See Appendix 4. Figure 31. 
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First of all, in figure 15, it is possible to appreciate high investment levels in the years 
previous to the hit of the crisis and even increasing in the early stage of it with a 
maximum investment greater than 1,8 million euros in 2008. 
In contrast, when the crisis really touched households’ income in 2009 there was drastic 
reduction on investment, which kept a regular down-sloping pattern until 2013. During 
this period, investment levels decreased by more than a half moving from 1 million 
euros to almost 0,4 million euros.  
Since 2013 onwards, El Corte Inglés have devoted not more than 0,6 million euros to 
investment. Actually it followed a stable trend close to 0,4 million euros, which is far 
from initial investment levels that were 4 times higher than recent ones. This fact made 
evident the need to reduce debt and to find strategies to increase company’s 
performance in constant decrease since 2008. 
Regarding the distribution of the investment, the major part of it was for material one. 
Material investment refers to everything related to building, properties, equipment and 
more which represented more than 60% of total investment, being almost 91% in 2007 
and moving between 70% and 85% between 2009 and 2016 as shown in table 7. At this 
point, it is important to recall company’s strategy based on opening department store in 
key locations all around the territory and its business model based on constant 
innovation. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
% Material 91% 61% 78% 80% 77% 81% 74% 80% 71% 70% 
% Intangibles 6% 5% 7% 7% 9% 15% 24% 19% 28% 28% 
% Financial 3% 34% 15% 14% 14% 5% 2% 1% 1% 2% 
 
  Table  7. Investment components percentage. Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
The other two components of total investment presented a shift between them. The 
proportion of investment in intangibles has been lower than 10% from 2007 to 2011, 
meanwhile financial investment during these years, except for 2007, was around 14% 
and 35%. In 2012 there is a shift where Intangibles kept increasing its proportion until 
representing almost 30% and financial did not represent more than 5%. The reason 
behind this pattern for intangibles is the emergence of new competitors from 2012 
58 
 
onwards, such as Amazon, mainly based on the e-commerce which forced the company 
to develop also online tools to be able to face the competition.  
Revenues and net profit 
Next, we will display an analysis of the evolution of revenues as well as net profit 
between 2007 and 2016. 
To begin with, both, revenues and net profit, followed a down-sloping pattern. Actually, 
net profit comes from earnings generated through revenues. As a result, the decrease in 
revenue generation triggered a drop in net profit. However, even though revenues 
reduction accounted for almost 2 million euros, net profit decreased dramatically from 
2007 to 2016, but significantly between 2007 and 2008 dropping  almost 370.000 euros 
as shown in figure 16. The reduction on net profit continued over the years being 
steeper from 2010 to 2012 and from 2013 to 2014. 
 
Figure 16. Evolution of Revenues and net profit from 2007 to 2016. Source: Author’s own elaboration from SABI 
data. 
Since the arrival of the new chairman, Dimas Gimeno succeeding its uncle Isidoro 
Álvarez, there is little improvement in both, revenues and net profit. This fact may be 
link to the reduction in investment as well as the reduction on financial leverage. 
In addition, El Corte Inglés workforce also dropped in the period between 2007 and 
2016 by around 17.000 employees.  
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In spite of this fact, personnel productivity expressed through sales/revenue per 
employee ratio, shows that current workforce which accounts for less employees than in 
2007, exhibits higher levels of productivity despite much lower revenues than in 2007. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
# employees 97.328 97.389 90.240 90.836 88.820 86.481 83.128 82.085 82.059 80.640 
sales/revenue 
employee 
189,34 € 180,83 € 183,76 € 183,32 € 180,26 € 171,53 € 174,12 € 180,19 € 188,17 € 195,77 € 
 
Table  8. Earnings per employee. Workforce productivity. Source: Author’s elaboration from SABI data. 
Indeed, in this year, El Corte Inglés workforce accounted for 97.328 and its earnings per 
employee were around 189.34€ meanwhile in 2016 personnel was 80.640 and its 
earnings were 195.77€. Overall, employees’ productivity has increased as the number of 
employees as well as revenues has been reduced as observed in table 8.  
We have also analysed profit by business line in order to understand individual 
contribution from each business line to the business as a whole.  
The most important business line is the one from the department store of El Corte 
Inglés. Until 2010, it has been able to generate a level of profitability close to 400.000 
euros. Despite the reduction on company’s operating efficiency it kept being the main 
source of net profit for the group as seen in figure 17.  
 
Figure 17. Net profit: El Corte Inglés business line. Source: Author’s own elaboration from El Corte Inglés annual 
reports.  
In regard with the other business lines from the group, the most important ones are 
Hipercor Hypermarkers, being the second most important source of profit just after El 
Corte Inglés; Óptica 2000, the TIC services, Insurances El Corte Inglés and the financial 
business line.  
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All of them, except from Opencor convenience store, the insurance and financial 
business line, presented a decreasing profit generation over the years. In contrast, the 
one devoted to financial issues has followed an up-and-down trend and the insurance 
line and convenience stores have increased its profitability, even though in the case of 
Opencor business line finally closed in 2013. 
 
Figure 18. Profit per business line. Source: Author’s own elaborations from El Corte Inglés annual reports. 
News selection 
Regarding the news selection, they have been classified in accordance to the issues they 
address.  
From a total of 19 news27 collected about El Corte Inglés, most of them made reference 
to performance, ownership and strategic management issues, concretely 14, 9 and 8 
respectively.  
When referring to performance most news highlighted the difficult situation El Corte 
Inglés strove between 2013 and 2017. In this sense, the news pointed out low levels of 
earnings growth within that period. Actually, many news related performance to 
ownership and conflicts of interest within the company. All these facts affected directly 
on strategic management decisions to be done in order to recover healthy and wealthy 
positions where El Corte Inglés was located in the past.  
Some news related the fail in operating performance to an obsolete business model 
which has to be rethought and renewed. Moreover, the succession of Isidoro Álvarez by 
Dimas Gimeno has been seen as an opportunity for the business as a whole to be 
                                                 
27 See Appendix 6. 
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updated and modernised. This is a great challenge for Dimas Gimeno due to the bad 
financial situation that El Corte Inglés was facing since the arrival of the crisis to 
Spanish households, which was the main source of income of the company since its 
business model was focused on the Spanish market. In this sense, four pieces of news 
directly referred to the business model of El Corte Inglés as well as the need to 
implement some changes to make it competitive for the current market situation. 
Moreover, some news also pointed out issues linked to future prospects of the company 
and corporate reputation, in both cases 2 pieces of news.  
The years with higher news concentration were 2015 and 2016 with five and seven 
news respectively. In the case of news from 2015, most of them addressed the 
ownership issue of the company. This year took place the modification of company’s 
internal norms in order to allow the entrance of a new external shareholder, the Sheikh 
Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al Thani with 10% of company shares. Indeed, it created an 
internal argument and disagreement which ended into the cessation of one member of 
the board of sharehoders, the Ceslar Corporation represented by Carlota Areces.   
In contrast, in 2016, all the news were related to El Corte Inglés business model, 
performance and corporate reputation apart from ownership again.  
4.4. Conclusions 
In regard with the case study developed about El Corte Inglés, it is possible to 
determine that despite being a well-reputed leading company, it has suffered the 
consequences of the crisis on the Spanish economy having a direct impact on 
households’ income and, therefore, households’ consumption, the main source of 
income for El Corte Inglés. As a result, company’s operational performance has been 
reduced, jointly with an increasing borrowing dependence financing company’s growth. 
The worst year for El Corte Inglés was 2014 due to the loss of its chairman, Isidoro 
Álvarez and its operational and financial bad performance which was reflected on its 
corporate reputation since there was a decrease in MERCO ranking. Actually, El Corte 
Inglés has been facing an increasing competition with the ability to perform efficiently 
at lower costs in the sector. 
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The leadership of the company, together with its business model based on client’s 
orientation and high level of innovation, has been an identity trait for the company. 
However, this familiar and conservative model was not always positive for them since it 
restricted new growth opportunities. Actually, the lack of these growth opportunities 
itself, as well as, internal conflicts within the company as the one that took place with 
the entry of a new external shareholder to the company, breaking the untouchable and 
rigid ownership structure, which led to project an image of instability.  
The change in the top of the board of directors after the death of Isidoro Álvarez in 
2014, with the arrival of Dimas Gimeno was seen as an opportunity for the company to 
update and adapt the business to new buying needs and features of the market. The new 
president, Dimas Gimeno, had to face a challenging situation with a highly diversified 
but unprofitable portfolio of different business units.  
The financial problem of the company was evident when analysing company’s financial 
structure. Certainly, the company exhibited problems in earnings generation from its 
capital and investments as shown by the evolution of its Return on Equity as well as its 
Return on Assets. Both presented the same pattern with a lack of ability to generate 
profitability from its capital or shareholders’ equity. Indeed, since 2009 onwards, total 
assets exceeded the value of revenues generated by the company. Moreover, the 
company traditionally has always invested a lot in property, plant and equipment 
expanding its operations all over the Spanish territory and even further to Portugal, 
which led to a situation of high inefficiency and the need to restructure all those 
department stores that were unprofitable and, instead of providing earnings to the 
company, they generated costs.   
Furthermore, El Corte Inglés showed high financial leverage which was an evidence of 
company’s borrowing dependency. The total liabilities of the company exceeded the 
value of shareholders’ equity which was a signal of growth financed by debt. The need 
to find alternative funding outside, since the company was not listed in the Spanish 
Stock Exchange to get financing sources, was partially solved with the arrival of the 
Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al Thani and its investment of 1.000 million euros 
in exchange of 10% shares of the company. This fact was seen as an opportunity to 
reverse that financial leverage since the company is obliged to fulfil the contract terms 
established by the new shareholder, which in case of impossibility to fulfil them would 
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imply an increase in Sheikh’s power over company’s decisions by increasing his 
percentage of shares.  
The media was not unaware of company’s situation highlighting its low profitability 
and ownership issues. Truthfully, the news pointed out the inherent need to change and 
adapt company’s business model in order to be able to overcome the current situation as 
a European leader in department store may do.  
Overall, all the analysis performed on financial dimension of the company proved the 
power that exerts the environment on the growth of the company which was evident in 
the case of El Corte Inglés and the hit of the crisis, as well as, the lack of attention to 
corporate reputation issues such as a strong and consistent ownership structure to take 
strategic decisions on company’s operating and financial performance.  
To sum up, it is essential for El Corte Inglés to find alternative ways to reverse 
unprofitability levels from certain department stores and, it that way, achieve earnings 
from invested capital in order to be attractive to future investors by lowering their debt 
and also their risk. All in all, recover their well-known past popularity by adapting its 
business model to new consumer needs and trends facing highly competitive markets by 
taking advantage of such attractive locations and large amount of assets they count with.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
Corporate reputation has the ability to capture lots of information about a company, not 
only internal corporate information but also external one which cannot be controlled by 
the company. Thus, it is essential to care about the image a company is projecting in 
order to build strong positive reputation such that the company can grow from a strong 
and stable basis of good practices and confidence on all its constituents.  
From the analysis performed on MERCO ranking data, it is possible to distinguish that 
corporate reputation is difficult to build and to keep certain stability due to constant 
changes in the environment affecting company’s performance and strategic decisions.  
Indeed, only big companies with well-known management and strong confidence 
generation have the ability to be placed for long periods in the top of the ranking 
performing successfully. Despite this fact, there are no guarantees for any company, 
regardless of its size or power or the years devoted to build up a strong reputation. In 
fact, corporate reputation can vanish quickly. However, it is not impossible to recover 
reputational levels, but it is time-consuming and requires appropriate strategic decision 
making and, if necessary, changes in the business model, policies or philosophy of the 
company, for instance, the case of El Corte Inglés or other companies such as the 
Volkswagen Group or Samsung.  
From MERCO analysis, it is evident that dominant companies in the ranking belong to 
the banking, technological; and Infrastructures and construction sectors even though not 
all companies from these sectors are leading ones.  
The top companies of the ranking are big players in each of their sectors which makes 
difficult for new ones to reach these top positions and keep certain stability. Actually, 
the main leaders have been there almost for 11 years, which represents 24%, meawhile 
just 20% of companies manage to be present in the ranking for one year.  
The main leaders are, firstly,  Inditex managed by Amacio Ortega, also a well-assessed 
leader by the Merco leaders’ ranking called ‘Merco Líderes’; followed by Mercadona 
managed by Juan Roig; and Santander.  
It is really convenient and beneficial to be included in any ranking assessing corporate 
reputation as a guarantee of firm’s capability to create value from their resources as well 
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as from good management of them. Actually, it is great to be included in the general 
Merco ranking or any other ranking such as Merco líderes or Merco Sectors due to its 
consolidated position as a measurement tool of Corporate Reputation.  
Overall, Corporate Reputation is a powerful intangible with the capability to certify 
company’s ability to manage properly, not only perceptions held by multiple 
stakeholders, but also the ability to fulfil the expectations they have rose.  
To sum up, the company must be aware of the importance of building strong and 
trustworthy reputations from the very beginning taking care of the relationships with all 
stakeholders because the aggregate perception allows comparing company’s situation 
across time and industries in order to find new strategies and solutions against 
uncertainty as well as competitors contributing to an overall better, stable and successful 
performance. 
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Appendix 1. Overview of the top100 companies included in MERCO ranking from 2007 to 2017. 
Position 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
1 
El Corte 
Inglés Inditex Inditex Telefónica Santander Inditex Inditex Inditex Inditex Inditex Inditex 
2 Inditex Telefónica Telefónica Santander Inditex Mercadona Mercadona Mercadona Mercadona Mercadona Mercadona 
3 Telefónica 
El Corte 
Inglés 
El Corte 
Inglés Inditex Telefónica Repsol Santander Santander Santander Santander Santander 
4 Repsol Repsol Santander La Caixa Repsol Santander Repsol Repsol Repsol BBVA Repsol 
5 BBVA Santander Repsol Iberdrola La Caixa Telefónica Iberdrola Telefónica Telefónica Repsol BBVA 
6 Santander La Caixa La Caixa Repsol Mercadona Iberdrola Telefónica BBVA BBVA Telefónica Telefónica 
7 La Caixa BBVA Iberdrola BBVA Iberdrola CaixaBank BBVA Iberdrola Iberdrola CaixaBank CaixaBank 
8 Iberdrola Iberdrola BBVA 
El Corte 
Inglés BBVA 
El Corte 
Inglés Mapfre Mapfre CaixaBank Iberdrola Mapfre 
9 Endesa Mercadona Mercadona Mercadona 
El Corte 
Inglés Google Coca-Cola CaixaBank Mapfre Mapfre Iberdrola 
10 Ferrovial Acciona Mapfre Mapfre Mapfre Mapfre CaixaBank Google Google Google 
ONCE y su 
fundación 
11 Mercadona Caja Madrid Caja Madrid Google Coca-Cola BBVA Google Ikea Danone 
ONCE y su 
fundación Google 
12 Caja Madrid Ferrovial Indra Acciona Google Coca-Cola Acciona Danone Nestlé Apple Apple 
13 Indra Mapfre Vodafone Ikea Acciona Ikea Ikea Nestlé Apple Nestlé 
Meliá Hotels 
International 
14 Mapfre Vodafone Microsoft 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa Ikea Danone Danone Apple Microsoft 
Mutua 
Madrileña 
Mutua 
Madrileña 
15 Acciona Bankinter Acciona Vodafone Danone Microsoft 
El Corte 
Inglés 
ONCE y su 
Fundación 
Mutua 
Madrileña Danone 
Mahou San 
Miguel 
16 Vodafone Indra Gas Natural  Coca-Cola Microsoft Acciona Apple 
Mutua 
Madrileña Ikea 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa Heineken 
17 Siemens IBM Ferrovial Microsoft Nestlé 
Mutua 
Madrileña Indra IESE 
ONCE y su 
fundación 
Meliá Hotels 
International 
El Corte 
Inglés 
18 Bankinter Gas Natural MRW Indra NH Hoteles Endesa Microsoft Indra 
Meliá Hotels 
International 
El Corte 
Inglés Danone 
19 ACS Microsoft Siemens Ferrovial Endesa Nestlé Nestlé Microsoft L'Oréal 
Mahou San 
Miguel Amazon 
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20 
Banco 
Popular Siemens IBM Caja Madrid 
Mutua 
Madrileña Apple IESE Acciona 
El Corte 
Inglés 
Banco 
Sabadell Leroy Merlin 
21 IBM ACS Gamesa Danone RENFE 
ONCE-
FUNDOSA 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa 
Mahou San 
Miguel 
Calidad 
Pascual Nestlé 
22 Gas Natural Endesa Ikea RENFE IBM 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa Siemens Siemens 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa Ikea 
Calidad 
Pascual 
23 Microsoft 
Banco 
Popular RENFE Abertis 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa Siemens Endesa L'Oréal Siemens Sanitas Ikea 
24 Abertis Abertis Nestlé Nestlé Indra IBM 
Mutua 
Madrileña 
EAE 
Business 
School Novartis 
NH Hotel 
Group 
Gas Natural 
Fenosa 
25 Grupo Agbar Novartis Abertis IBM Ferrovial RENFE 
ONCE y su 
Fundación La Fageda IBM Bankinter Coca-Cola 
26 Gamesa Accenture 
Instituto de la 
empresa ACS REE REE IBM Accenture IESE Coca-Cola 
Banco 
Sabadell 
27 Accenture MRW Novartis 
Grupo 
AGBAR Sanitas Indra Accenture Novartis La Fageda Leroy Merlin Sanitas 
28 Iberia Gamesa Coca-Cola Siemens Sol Meliá MRW Novartis 
Banco 
Sabadell P&G Amazon Bankinter 
29 Novartis Nestlé Google Sanitas Abertis Abengoa 
Calidad 
Pascual 
Mahou San 
Miguel Acciona L'Oréal RENFE 
30 
Instituto de 
Empresa CEPSA Sanitas Endesa 
ONCE-
Fundosa NH Hoteles 
Instituto de la 
empresa 
Calidad 
Pascual Sanitas Siemens 
DKV 
Seguros 
31 IESE Coca-Cola Danone Bankinter FCC Accenture 
EAE 
Business 
School 
Meliá Hotels 
International 
Banco 
Sabadell Microsoft Campofrío 
32 Nestlé 
DKV 
Seguros 
DVK 
Seguros 
DKV 
Seguros Apple Abertis Ferrovial 
El Corte 
Inglés 
DKV 
Seguros RENFE Microsoft 
33 MRW 
Instituto de la 
empresa 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers 
ONCE-
Fundosa 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Cooper IESE 
Meliá Hotels 
International Toyota Coca-Cola 
DKV 
Seguros Siemens 
34 Banesto IESE 
Mutua 
Madrileña 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Cooper Siemens 
Leche 
Pascual ESIC Sanitas 
NH Hotel 
Group Acciona Decathlon 
35 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Coopers Iberia Accenture NH Hoteles Accenture 
Meliá Hotels 
International Toyota 
NH Hotel 
Group Leroy Merlin 
Red Eléctrica 
de España AENA 
36 Danone Bancaja Banesto 
Mutua 
Madrileña IESE ADIF L'Oréal Leroy Merlin 
EAE 
Business 
School Heineken 
Grupo 
Damm 
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37 
DKV 
Seguros 
Grupo 
AGBAR Endesa Abengoa ACS Sanitas Sanitas P&G Indra Vodafone 
Red Eléctrica 
de España 
38 CEPSA Eroski 
Grupo 
AGBAR Banesto MRW Novartis PWC 
Hewlett 
Packard ING Bank IBM Acciona 
39 EROSKI Danone Deloitte 
Instituto de la 
empresa L'Oréal Gamesa 
Segurcaixa 
Adeslas Abertis IAG P&G 
Mercedes 
Benz 
40 
Unión 
Fenosa Nokia ACS IESE 
DKV 
Seguros L'Oréal Abertis 
DKV 
Seguros 
Calidad 
Pascual BMW Linea Directa 
41 
Banco 
Sabadell FCC NH Hoteles Caja Navarra Caja Madrid 
Instituto de la 
empresa 
Mercedes 
Benz 
Instituto de la 
empresa Prosegur IESE AXA 
42 Coca-Cola 
Unión 
Fenosa 
ONCE-
Fundosa Novartis Abengoa FCC Garrigues IBM 
Grupo 
Volkswagen Prosegur L'Oréal 
43 Bancaja ESADE Eroski MRW 
Instituto de la 
empresa Garrigues 
Grupo 
Volkswagen Grupo Siro 
Mercedes 
Benz Campofrío Prosegur 
44 Deloitte NH Hoteles Mango L'Oréal 
Leche 
Pascual Toyota ESADE ESIC 
Grupo 
Damm 
Grupo 
Damm 
NH Hotel 
Group 
45 Nokia 
Price 
Waterhouse 
Cooper Bankinter REE ESADE 
Corporación 
Mondragón Deloitte ESADE Vodafone 
EAE 
Business 
School ALSA 
46 Orange Ikea IESE Accenture Deloitte EAE RENFE Garrigues Accenture DIA La Fageda 
47 FCC ING Direct 
Banco 
Popular ESADE 
VidaCaixa 
Grupo 
Price 
Wterhouse 
Coopers Grupo Siro ING Direct RENFE 
Mercedes 
Benz BMW 
48 Ikea 
ONCE-
Fundosa 
Unión 
Fenosa P&G Gamesa ACS P&G Zeltia 
Instituto de la 
empresa AENA P&G 
49 RENFE Sanitas ESADE Bancaja Garrigues Deloitte REE Gamesa 
Suez 
Environneme
nt Company 
Banco 
Popular CEPSA 
50 
Sacyr 
Vallhermoso Banesto AC Hoteles Nokia ADIF 
DKV 
Seguros Vodafone Endesa Bankinter Linea Directa CLH 
51 
Leche 
Pascual Deloitte BP Oil 
Banco 
Popular Iberia Ferrovial 
DKV 
Seguros IAG 
ESIC 
Business and 
Marketing 
School Novartis Vodafone 
52 
BSH 
Electrodomes
ticos RENFE CEPSA 
Leche 
Pascual 
Grupo 
Volkswagen Eroski Gamesa CLH ESADE CLH Indra 
53 Ericsson Google Nokia AC Hoteles Nokia ESADE CLH Prosegur Amazon La Fageda 
Instituto de la 
empresa 
75 
 
54 NH hoteles MANGO FCC FCC Novartis 
Grupo 
Volkswagen La Fageda PWC BMW Toyota 
EAE 
Business 
School 
55 Isofotón 
Banco 
Sabadell REE Sol Meliá CEPSA BMW ALSA Linea Directa REE Deloitte IAG 
56 AC Hoteles SOS Cuétara 
Leche 
Pascual Deloitte Bankinter Grupo Siro ING Direct Enagás Enagás Accenture Toyota 
57 ESADE 
BSH 
Electrodomés
ticos 
BSH 
Electrodomes
ticos ING Direct ING Direct Enagás Prosegur RENFE 
Banco 
Popular 
ESIC 
Business and 
marketing 
school Garrigues 
58 Sanitas AC Hoteles L'Oréal CEPSA 
Grupo 
AGBAR ALSA Abengoa Coca-Cola Endesa Suez Spain Carrefour 
59 ING Direct 
Procter&Ga
mble SONY ESIC 
Banco 
Sabadell Vodafone 
Corporación 
Mondragón Bankinter Deloitte Decathlon DIA 
60 
ONCE-
Fundosa Orange 
Hewlett 
Packard 
General 
Electric CLH CLH Leroy Merlin Deloitte Zeltia Samsung Samsung 
61 Prisa REE Bancaja 
Banco 
Sabadell Bancaja MANGO MANGO 
Mercedes 
Benz CLh ING Bank Accenture 
62 Carrefour Ericsson Iberia Gamesa Vodafone 
Metro de 
Madrid Samsung REE Abertis IAG Eroski 
63 BP Oil 
Sacyr 
Vallhermoso Sol Meliá ADIF 
Banco 
Popular 
SegurCaixa 
Adeslas FCC Vodafone Decathlon 
Instituto de la 
empresa Novartis 
64 
General 
Electric 
Leche 
Pascual Adeslas BP Oil 
Metro de 
Madrid 
Banco 
Sabadell Línea Directa 
Grupo 
Volkswagen Gamesa Garrigues IBM 
65 Sos Cuétara Adeslas Caja Navarra Eroski EAE Prosegur BMW 
Banco 
Popular Garrigues Abertis ING Bank 
66 Holcim Caja Navarra Abengoa Iberia Grupo Siro AC Hoteles 
NH Hotel 
Group FCC Samsung Nike Nike 
67 Vocento Isofotón EAE MANGO MANGO ESIC 
Banco 
Popular Agbar Linea Directa SONY Abertis 
68 Prosegur BP Oil 
Banco 
Sabadell SONY Enagás 
Grupo 
AGBAR 
Banco 
Sabadell BMW PWC Gamesa Deloitte 
69 REE Holcim Holcim La Fageda Toyota La Fageda Zeltia ADIF Abengoa PWC Triodos Bank 
70 Ebro Puleva 
Mutua 
Madrileña ING Direct CLH ESIC Bankinter AC Hoteles Decathlon Campofrío Eroski Bankia 
71 L'Oréal Sol Meliá Garrigues Lilly Zeltia Iberia Agbar Samsung SONY Indra MANGO 
72 MANGO 
Caixa 
Catalunya SOS Cuétara Adecco 
Corporación 
Mondragón SONY ADIF Grifols Toyota Adidas 
ESIC 
Business and 
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Marketing 
School 
73 Tarradellas 
General 
Electric 
General 
Electric 
Hewlett 
Packard Adecco ING Direct SONY Amazon Everis MANGO PWC 
74 
Grupo 
Planeta Zeltia ESIC Apple Everis CEPSA Bankinter SONY Eroski Carrefour IESE 
75 
Corporación 
Mondragón CLH Carrefour EAE BMW NOKIA Everis MANGO Triodos Bank Triodos Bank ESADE 
76 
Hewlett 
Packard Abengoa KPMG Grupo Siro 
General 
Electric 
General 
Electric Grupo ACS Grupo ACS Grifols Endesa Grupo ACS 
77 Adeslas ESIC BASF 
Schneider 
electric La Fageda EBRO foods 
Grupo 
Planeta 
Grupo 
Planeta MANGO Unilever 
BSH 
Electrodomes
ticos/Balay 
78 ESIC Prisa CLH Everis 
BSH 
Electrodomes
ticos 
Grupo 
Planeta Grifols Ferrovial Grupo ACS ESADE Unilever 
79 SONY BASF Atos Origin 
Grupo 
Volkswagen 
Grupo 
Planeta 
Banco 
Popular Kellogg's Everis Unilever Bankia Amadeus 
80 Lilly Carrefour Allianz Enagás BP Oil Everis Campofrío Unilever FCC Grupo ACS Airbus group 
81 
Catalana 
Occidente Lilly Orange 
Grupo 
Planeta Banesto 
Grupo Villar 
MIR Eroski Abengoa 
Grupo 
Planeta Codorniu Endesa 
82 
Mutua 
Madrileña L'Oréal 
Grupo 
Planeta El Bulli Prosegur Linea Directa Decathlon CEPSA DIA Desigual 
Banco 
Popular 
83 
Clínica 
Universitaria 
de Navarra 
Ernest&You
ng Grupo Siro 
Boston 
Consulting 
Schneider 
electric Unilever 
Grupo Villar 
MIR DIA Desigual FCC 
Grupo 
Planeta 
84 
Procter&Ga
mble 
Grupo 
Planeta 
Schneider 
electric ABB 
Bassat 
Ogilvy Grupo VIPS DIA Campofrío 
Barceló 
Hotels and 
resorts 
Grupo 
Planeta Adecco 
85 Toyota Allianz Adecco Portland Orange Grupo Puig Imaginarium 
Grupo 
Damm Carrefour 
Grupo 
Volkswagen 
Grupo 
Volkswagen 
86 EAE Vocento 
Procter & 
Gamble Vocento 
Dow 
Chemical Bankia Unilever Eroski Nike Amadeus Talgo 
87 Metrovacesa Grupo Siro 
Caixa 
Catalunya Globalia Portland Banesto Carrefour McDonald's CEPSA Airbus group Ferrovial 
88 Abengoa 
Corporación 
Mondragón ADIF 
Dow 
Chemical ABB Grifols 
Mahou San 
Miguel Carrefour Ferrovial Bimba y Lola Sacyr 
89 CLH Adecco Lilly Tecnove Mckinsey Euskatel Almirall ESTEVE 
Técnicas 
reunidas Orange Holaluz 
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90 Google Grupo VIPS Globalia Adeslas 
Grupo Villar 
MIR Vueling McDonald's Desigual EY Ferrovial Grifols 
91 
Caixa 
Catalunya EAE Vocento ALSA P&G 
Vidacaixa 
Grupo 
Ogilvy & 
Mather Orange 
Corporación 
Mondragón SENER Orange 
92 ONO Globalia ALSA Carrefour AC Hoteles Carrefour Grupo Puig Acerinox Grupo Prisa Grifols FCC 
93 ADECCO SONY Tarradellas Orange Carrefour Zeltia 
General 
Electric 
Técnicas 
reunidas 
Grupo Villar 
MIR 
Técnicas 
reunidas Everis 
94 Renault Cemex Ericsson 
Caixa 
Catalunya Banca civica McDonald's 
Técnicas 
reunidas Havas Media Grupo Siro Grupo Prisa 
Técnicas 
reunidas 
95 Campofrío Tarradellas Prisa Grupo VIPS Grupo VIPS Adecco Vueling Grupo Prisa Imaginarium 
Grupo Villar 
MIR Grupo Prisa 
96 Lafarge Lafarge Cemex Garrigues Eroski Lilly 
Metro de 
Madrid 
Grupo Villar 
MIR BBK Enagás Renault 
97 Sol Meliá 
Hewlett 
Packard Lafarge McKinsey SONY Vocento Iberia 
Corporación 
Mondragón Airbus group 
Unicaja 
Banco Enagás 
98 Zeltia ALSA Kutxa CAF 
Hewlett 
Packard 
Schneider 
electric Adecco Triodos Bank H&M Everis Desigual 
99 BASF Kutxa Seur Zeltia Lilly 
Mercedes 
Benz Amazon Imaginarium Orange ALSA 
Corporacion 
Gestamp 
100 Unicaja Altadis Grupo VIPS 
Corp.Mondra
gón Globalia Prisa 
Sanofi 
Aventis Almirall Renault CEPSA Gamesa 
 
Table A 1. Overview of top 100 companies included in MERCO ranking from 2007 to 2017. Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from MERCO ranking.  
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Appendix 2: Sector distribution of the top 100 companies from 2007 to 2017. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 1. Distribution by sectors in 2007. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
Figure A 2. Distribution by sectors in 2008. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
Figure A 3. Distribution by sectors in 2009. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
     
Figure A 4. Distribution by sectors in 2010. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
Figure A 5. Distribution by sectors in 2011. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
Figure A 6. Distribution by sectors in 2012. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
13%
5%
5%
5%
4%
7%
2%4%4%9%
3%
5%
3%
31%
Distribution by 
sectors 2010
12%
5%
5%
5%
4%
8%
3%4%4%8%
3%
4%
3%
32%
Distribution by 
sectors 
2011
10%
5%
5%
6%
4%
8%
5%
3%5%6%
3%
5%
4%
31%
Distribution by 
sectors 2012
12%
5%
6%
7%
4%
6%
3%4%2%8%
4%
3%
3%
33%
Distribution by 
sectors 2007 
13%
5%
6%
6%
4%
6%
3%4%4%8%
3%
4%
3%
31%
Distribution by 
sectors 2008
14%
5%
5%
6%
4%
6%
4%4%4%8%
3%
4%
2%
31%
Distribution by 
sectors 2009
79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A 7. Distribution by sectors in 2013. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
 
Figure A 8. Distribution by sectors in 2014     
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
 
Figure A 9. Distribution by sectors in 2015. 
Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A 10. Distribution by sectors in 
2016. Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
 
Figure A 11. Distribution by sectors in 
2017. Source: Author’s own elaborations. 
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Appendix 3. El Corte Inglés timeline 
  
 
Figure A 12. El Corte Inglés timeline: 1940-2017. Source: Author’s own elaboration from El Corte Inglés website. 
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Appendix 4. El Corte Inglés presence in Spain and Portugal. 
 
   Figure A 13. El Corte Inglés presence in Spain and Portugal. Source: El Corte Inglés. 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
Appendix 5. El Corte Ingles corporate data: Balance Sheet, Income Statement and ratios. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Consolidated Accounts 
29/02/2008 28/02/2009 28/02/2010 28/02/2011 29/02/2012 28/02/2013 28/02/2014 28/02/2015 29/02/2016 28/02/2017 
 
12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 
 
Approved Approved Approved Approved Caveats Caveats 
Favorable with 
uncertainty 
Approved Approved Approved 
 
Abreviated Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 
Balance Sheet 
          
Non-current Assets 11.008.446,00€ 12.274.265,00€ 12.730.621,00€ 13.060.402,00€ 13.325.264,00€ 13.450.800,00€ 15.681.437,00€ 15.625.753,00€ 15.690.177,00€ 15.415.598,00€ 
Intangible assets 825.813,00€ 463.838,00€ 466.103,00€ 465.555,00€ 513.016,00€ 508.198,00€ 520.858,00€ 520.779,00€ 546.190,00€ 572.095,00€ 
PP&E 9.410.114,00€ 10.077.528,00€ 10.409.560,00€ 10.622.750,00€ 10.631.374,00€ 10.678.867,00€ 12.941.064,00€ 12.747.769,00€ 12.610.443,00€ 12.304.258,00€ 
Other fixed assets 772.519,00€ 1.732.899,00€ 1.854.958,00€ 1.972.097,00€ 2.180.874,00€ 2.263.735,00€ 2.219.515,00€ 2.357.205,00€ 2.533.544,00€ 2.539.245,00€ 
Current Assets 3.588.852,00€ 5.313.650,00€ 4.997.303,00€ 4.892.655,00€ 4.880.660,00€ 4.652.938,00€ 2.600.235,00€ 2.901.952,00€ 2.941.043,00€ 3.093.448,00€ 
Inventory 2.273.106,00€ 2.366.387,00€ 2.139.940,00€ 2.332.804,00€ 2.251.376,00€ 2.286.487,00€ 1.648.109,00€ 1.788.351,00€ 1.897.925,00€ 1.860.880,00€ 
Accounts receivable 990.248,00€ 2.601.165,00€ 2.400.497,00€ 2.264.102,00€ 2.257.327,00€ 2.073.428,00€ 777.594,00€ 829.326,00€ 783.504,00€ 984.605,00€ 
Other current assets 325.498,00€ 346.098,00€ 456.866,00€ 295.749,00€ 371.957,00€ 293.023,00€ 174.532,00€ 284.275,00€ 259.614,00€ 247.963,00€ 
Cash and cash equivalents 261.921,00€ 178.456,00€ 211.823,00€ 108.182,00€ 191.598,00€ 105.833,00€ 90.107,00€ 125.777,00€ 171.406,00€ 154.139,00€ 
Total Assets 14.597.298,00€ 17.587.915,00€ 17.727.924,00€ 17.953.057,00€ 18.205.924,00€ 18.103.738,00€ 18.281.672,00€ 18.527.705,00€ 18.631.220,00€ 18.509.046,00€ 
           
Shareholders' Equity 7.840.221,00€ 7.590.286,00€ 7.818.280,00€ 8.009.660,00€ 7.422.349,00€ 7.401.539,00€ 7.845.632,00€ 7.875.300,00€ 8.727.739,00€ 8.658.815,00€ 
Share capital 473.340,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 486.864,00€ 
Other SE 7.366.881,00€ 7.103.422,00€ 7.331.416,00€ 7.522.796,00€ 6.935.485,00€ 6.914.675,00€ 7.358.768,00€ 7.388.436,00€ 8.240.875,00€ 8.171.951,00€ 
Total Liabilities 6.757.077,00€ 9.997.629,00€ 9.909.644,00€ 9.943.397,00€ 10.783.575,00€ 10.702.199,00€ 10.436.040,00€ 10.652.405,00€ 9.903.481,00€ 9.850.231,00€ 
Non-current Liabilities 1.925.405,00€ 3.585.123,00€ 4.804.073,00€ 4.200.680,00€ 4.710.888,00€ 4.623.638,00€ 7.150.444,00€ 7.309.902,00€ 6.154.824,00€ 6.074.891,00€ 
Current Liabilities 4.831.672,00€ 6.412.506,00€ 5.105.571,00 5.742.717,00€ 6.072.687,00€ 6.078.561,00€ 3.285.596,00€ 3.342.503,00€ 3.748.657,00€ 3.775.340,00€ 
Shareholders' Equity and 
Liabilities 
14.597.298,00€ 17.587.915,00€ 17.727.924,00€ 17.953.057,00€ 18.205.924,00€ 18.103.738,00€ 18.281.672,00€ 18.527.705,00€ 18.631.220,00€ 18.509.046,00€ 
           
Working capital 331.223,00€ 2.550.909,00€ 2.136.521,00€ 2.241.270,00€ 2.353.372,00€ 2.328.036,00€ -       509.295,00€ 383.132,00€ 364.527,00€ 656.432,00€ 
Employees 97.328,00€ 97.389,00€ 90.240,00€ 90.836,00€ 88.820,00€ 86.481,00€ 83.128,00€ 82.085,00€ 82.059,00€ 80.640,00€ 
Table A 2. Balance Sheet.Source: Author’s elaboration. Data from Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI). 
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Consolidated 
accounts 
29/02/2008 28/02/2009 28/02/2010 28/02/2011 29/02/2012 28/02/2013 28/02/2014 28/02/2015 29/02/2016 28/02/2017 
 
12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 12 months 
 
Approved Approved Approved Approved Caveats Caveats 
Favourable with 
uncertainty 
Approved Approved Approved 
 
Abreviado Conso PGC 2007 Conso PGC 2007 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 Conso PGC 2010 
Income Statement 
          
Revenues 18.428.463,00€ 17.610.884,00€ 16.582.425,00€ 16.652.024,00€ 16.010.975,00€ 14.833.918,00€ 14.474.460,00 € 14.791.012,00€ 15.440.851,00€ 15.786.628,00€ 
Net sales 17.897.978,00€ 17.362.526,00€ 16.356.255,00€ 16.413.415,00€ 15.777.745,00€ 14.552.454,00€ 14.291.678,00 € 14.592.029,00€ 15.219.842,00€ 15.504.573,00€ 
Operating income 890.183,00€ 565.379,00€ 537.349,00€ 443.688,00€ 328.202,00€ 336.403,00€ 185.789,00 € 295.708,00€ 299.131,00€ 319.454,00€ 
Financial revenues 73.353,00€ 148.033,00€ 110.728,00€ 166.784,00€ 111.203,00€ 114.032,00€ 135.530,00 € 65.358,00€ 59.283,00€ 72.818,00€ 
Financial revenues 121.561,00€ 223.239,00€ 191.710,00€ 197.036,00€ 248.090,00€ 274.744,00€ 306.200,00 € 346.258,00€ 281.408,00€ 214.934,00€ 
Financial results -         48.208,00€ -         75.206,00€ -         80.982,00€ -         30.252,00€ -       136.887,00€ -       160.712,00€ -       170.670,00 € -       280.900,00€ -       222.125,00€ -       142.116,00€ 
** 841.975,00€ 490.173,00€ 456.367,00€ 413.436,00€ 191.315,00€ 175.691,00€ 15.119,00 € 14.808,00€ 77.006,00€ 177.338,00€ 
Taxes 226.750,00€ 115.409,00€ 87.199,00€ 94.029,00€ -         18.672,00€ 4.182,00€ -       126.370,00 € -       103.270,00€ -         81.127,00€ 15.479,00€ 
Net profit 744.725,00€ 374.764,00€ 369.168,00€ 319.407,00€ 209.987,00€ 171.509,00€ 174.349,00 € 118.078,00€ 158.133,00€ 161.859,00€ 
           
Materials 12.408.903,00€ 12.100.177,00€ 11.317.318,00€ 11.397.244,00€ 11.011.105,00€ 10.141.371,00€ 9.898.690,00 € 10.226.009,00€ 10.760.014,00€ 11.000.011,00€ 
Personnel 2.906.182,00€ 2.986.267,00€ 2.817.655,00€ 2.884.305,00€ 2.805.344,00€ 2.656.604,00€ 2.587.844,00 € 2.556.065,00€ 2.607.906,00€ 2.521.950,00€ 
Amortization 588.878,00€ 520.378,00€ 545.305,00€ 548.835,00€ 505.329,00€ 515.853,00€ 549.716,00 € 516.612,00€ 522.389,00€ 519.153,00€ 
Financial costs 121.561,00€ 214.668,00€ 180.753,00€ 197.036,00€ 243.504,00€ 271.131,00€ 305.459,00 € 341.924,00€ 268.804,00€ 207.413,00€ 
           
Cash flow 1.333.603,00€ 895.142,00€ 914.473,00€ 868.242,00€ 715.316,00€ 687.362,00€ 724.065,00 € 634.690,00€ 680.522,00€ 681.012,00€ 
Aggregated value 4.588.096,00€ 4.211.486,00€ 4.000.080,00€ 4.043.612,00€ 3.745.492,00€ 3.619.279,00€ 3.490.998,00 € 3.429.409,00€ 3.476.105,00€ 3.425.854,00€ 
EBIT 890.183,00€ 565.379,00€ 537.349,00€ 443.688,00€ 328.202,00€ 336.403,00€ 185.789,00 € 295.708,00€ 299.131,00€ 319.454,00€ 
EBITDA 1.479.061,00€ 1.085.757,00€ 1.082.654,00€ 992.523,00€ 833.531,00€ 852.256,00€ 735.505,00 € 812.320,00€ 821.520,00€ 838.607,00€ 
Table A 3. Income Statement.Source: Author’s elaboration. Data from Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos (SABI). 
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ROE (2)28 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Net profit 744.725,00   374.764,00   369.168,00  319.407,00  209.987,00   171.509,00  174.349,00  118.078,00  158.133,00 00 161.859,00  
Revenues 18.428.463,00 17.610.884,00 16.582.425,00  16.652.024,00 16.010.975,00     14.833.918,00 14.474.460,00  14.791.012,00    15.440.851,00  15.786.628,00 
Total 
Assets 
14.597.298,00  17.587.915,00  17.727.924,00  17.953.057,00  18.205.924,00     18.103.738,00  18.281.672,00 18.527.705,00     18.631.220,00  18.509.046,00  
Equity   7.840.221,00  7.590.286,00  7.818.280,00  8.009.660,00  7.422.349,00       7.401.539,00  7.845.632,00  7.875.300,00       8.727.739,00  8.658.815,00  
ROE  9,50% 4,94% 4,72% 3,99% 2,83% 2,32% 2,22% 1,50% 1,81% 1,87% 
Profit 
margin 
0,040 0,021 0,022 0,019 0,013 0,012 0,012 0,008 0,010 0,010 
Asset 
Turnover 
1,262 1,001 0,935 0,928 0,879 0,819 0,792 0,798 0,829 0,853 
Equity 
multiplie
r 
1,862 2,317 2,267 2,241 2,453 2,446 2,330 2,353 2,135 2,138 
ROA 5,10% 2,13% 2,08% 1,78% 1,15% 0,95% 0,95% 0,64% 0,85% 0,87% 
 
Table A 4. El Corte Inglés timeline: 1940-2017. Author’s own elaboration from SABI data. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
El Corte Inglés 377,81 383,66 392,4 297,94 264,52 274,85 186,29 170,03 184,52 
Hipercor 112,2 72,51 53,96 35,91 4,48 7,28 5,28 0,02 1,07 
Bricolaje Bricor -17,44 -9,56 -8,56 -9,4 -15,54 -11,94 -10,1 -8,67 -5,9 
Agencia de Viajes -14,8 -9,12 -20,34 -14,92 -7,03 3,69 37,42 38,12 31,16 
Supercor -27,19 -17,46 -2,84 1,89 -20,14 -20,32 -7,31 0,26 4,71 
Opencor  4,03 4,59 4,42 5,18 10,05 22,14 0 0 0 
Sfera  -6,06 -7,6 -17,8 -18,91 4,59 4,77 23,35 24,42 11,45 
Óptica 2000  64,28 61,2 63,29 53,87 41,34 34,73 5,53 6,68 7,15 
TIC  30,87 39,39 43,96 41,87 37,8 20,54 24,18 14,27 12,16 
Correduría de seguros 32 32,46 31,91 34,81 37,34 40,26 44,42 47,55 51,45 
Financiera  8,44 28,04 42,2 29,55 42,56 32,86 24,97 26,1 32,77 
Other  -22,15 24,45 30,95 5,62 0,68 -4,75 0,64 -0,36 33,01 
 
Table A 5. Profitability by business unit. Source: Author’s elaboration by data from El Corte Inglés annual reports.  
                                                 
28 ROE computation from disglosed formula: Equation 2. 
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Date Source Title Issues 
April 14, 2013 
Pymesyautonom
os.com 
¿Está atravesando El Corte 
Inglés por problemas 
financieros? 
 Performance 
May 20, 2013 Eldiario.es 
El Corte Inglés se ve 
forzado a refinanciar su 
deuda de 5.000 millones de 
euros. 
 Performance 
 Strategic management 
September 14, 
2014 
Financial Times 
by Tobias Buck 
Álvarez of El Corte Inglés 
diez aged 79. 
 Ownership 
 Performance 
September 15, 
2014 
Capital Madrid 
by Carlos Fons 
El Corte Inglés saldaría 
toda su deuda saliendo a 
bolsa sin ni siquiera perder 
el control. 
 Ownership 
 Strategic management 
January 27, 
2015 
El Economista 
by Javier 
Romera 
El Corte Inglés avaló su 
refinanciación con Hipercor 
y la agencia de viajes. 
 Performance 
 Strategic management 
August 30, 
2015 
El Confidencial 
by S- McCoy 
Dimas, tenemos un 
problema: El Corte Inglés 
no gana dinero. 
 Performance 
August 30, 
2015 
El Confidencial 
by Carlos 
Hernanz 
Qatar aterriza con un 
12,25% del capital de El 
Corte Inglés y tiene 
garantías sobre otro 3% 
 Ownership structure 
September 12, 
2015 
The Economist 
A debt hangover is forcing 
some family firms to seek 
outside help. Opening up. 
 Ownership structure 
September 15, 
2015 
Expansión 
Dimas Gimeno, un año al 
frente de El Corte Inglés 
 Ownership 
January 7, 
2016 
Hispanidad.com 
El Corte Inglés, en guerra 
civil. Un grave problema de 
reputación corporativa 
 Corporate reputation 
 Performance 
 Strategic management 
January 31, 
2016 
Mil21.es 
Endeudamiento, pérdidas y 
modelo de negocio obsoleto 
lastran El Corte Inglés. 
 Business model 
 Ownership structure 
 Performance 
March 1, 2016 El Mundo 
El Corte Inglés pone en 
venta 200 inmuebles por 
1.000 millones de euros. 
 Strategic management 
 Future prospects 
May 16, 2016 
Financial Times 
by Tobias Buck 
The big read: El Corte 
Inglés. Spanish retail: Deep 
cuts in store 
 Business model 
 Ownership structure 
 Performance 
May 17, 2016 Radiocable.com 
Los problemas de El Corte 
Inglés puestos de relieve en 
el Financial Times 
 Business model 
 Ownership structure 
 Performance 
June 7, 2016 
prnoticias by 
Gonzalo 
Fernández 
Qué empresas y por qué han 
perdido reputación en los 
últimos años. 
 Corpoarte reputation 
 Strategic management 
 Performance 
February 7, 
2017 
El Periódico by 
Agustín Catalán 
El Grupo El Corte Inglés 
genera más de 340.000 
empleos con un immpactio 
económico equivalente al 
2,4% del PIB. 
 Performance 
Appendix 6. News Collection 
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Table A 6. News classification. Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
 
April 17, 2017 
Merca2.es by 
Arturo Criado 
Así se está desangrando El 
Corte Inglés 
 Business model 
 Performance 
 Strategic management 
May 29, 2017 
El Confidencial 
by Agustín 
Marco 
Qatar exige a El Corte 
Inglés que inicie el estudio 
de su proceso de salida a 
bolsa. 
 Ownership 
 Performance 
 Future prospects 
 Strategic management 
November 27, 
2017 
El Confidencial 
by Agustín 
Marco 
El Corte Inglés y la banca 
se reúnen  para negociar la 
deuda y los pagarés de la 
plantilla. 
 Financial 
performance, 
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